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PREFACE
Introduction
Investor beliefs and forecast evaluation have emerged gradually to become major
interest of my research during my Ph.D. study. The forward-looking nature of economic
agents in decision-making, which drives a wedge between economics and natural
science, rendering agent’s belief or forecast a central and fantastic object of research. In
modern finance theory expectation plays a key role. Asset prices, for example, clearly
depend on expected future price. Therefore, how investor expectations are formed, and
what are the effects they may have on decisions and financial market outcomes have
become issues of central importance.
Forming a “right” belief is usually a challenging task for investors. In the real world
a common problem faced by agents is that the underlying true model is unknown.
Economic theory often provides no clear-cut guidelines on the exact way of forming
one’s “correct” belief. Sometimes agents need to formulate expectations on the basis of
available data with desired forecasting models. Yet to find the “right” model to form
beliefs means a model search if there are multiple forecasts to choose from. Forecast
evaluation becomes essential for decision making in these situations. A failure to
make correct evaluation creates biased beliefs, which can in turn affect the economic
outcomes.
Additional complication comes from the fact that relationships among economic vari-
ables are time varying, although a stable relationship is repeatedly assumed in eco-
nomics and finance literature. How to form a better belief in such an environment
deserves a close scrutiny.
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This dissertation examines these issues under several specific but important situations.
The first chapter studies the impact of investors’ biased belief and its cross-investor
dispersion on skewness of future aggregate market return. The measures of biased
belief and its dispersion is constructed from one class of commonly used forecasting
models in financial market: technical analysis. To assess whether such forecasts are in-
deed biased, the second essay examines the extent of bias due to the search for superior
trading strategies, a common practice engaged by investors and researchers. The third
chapter focuses on forecast evaluation. It examines the forecasting performance of yield
curve variables for economic growth, especially in an environment characterized by
model instability.
In the following paragraphs, I will briefly describe how each of the three different
chapters of this thesis is designed to contribute to the existing literature.
Belief Induced Market Skewness
Chapter 1 (“Sentiment, Convergence of Opinion, and Market Crash”) investigates
whether investor beliefs help forecast the return asymmetry. More concretely, it
examines whether two features of beliefs among trend chasing investors, investor
sentiment and differences of opinion, predict the conditional skewness of aggregate
market returns.
Asymmetry is prevalent in stock returns. In particular, market returns “go up by the
stairs and down by the elevator”. This phenomena mirrors the empirical evidence of
negative skewness, which is often taken as a measure of crash risk for the aggregate
stock market. More interestingly, market sometimes crashes without substantial news
to justify it. A famous example of this kind is the “Black Monday” in October 1987.
Several theories have been proposed to explain the economic mechanism underlying the
observed skewness, such as stochastic bubbles theory [Blanchard and Watson (1982)],
leverage effect, volatility feedback effect. Most of the empirical literature, however, are
unable to establish these economic links for the aggregate market return. For example,
2
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Charoenrook and Daouk (2008) find evidence inconsistent with leverage effect and
volatility feedback effect.
Recent developments in behavior finance augment the standard theory with biased
expectations such as investor sentiment [e.g., De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Wald-
mann (1990)], or with heterogeneity in expectations [e.g., Hong and Stein (2003)], to
facilitate an alternative explanation. One prominent example of investor sentiment in
theoretical papers is the technical trading, where investors form their beliefs based on
mechanical trading rules without consideration of fundamentals. Technical analysis
generates also differences of opinion when different investors apply different trading
strategies. This heterogeneity stems solely from the application of different models
and only on public information, which distinguishes itself from studies of information
asymmetry. It is therefore interesting to examine the implications of investor sentiment
and differences of opinion on asset price dynamics due to the application of technical
analysis.
The main goal of this chapter is to examine whether investor sentiment and disagree-
ment among trend-chasing investors forecast skewness in daily aggregate stock market
returns. I make two contributions to the literature. First, I construct a new mea-
sure of investor sentiment and differences of opinion among trend-chasing investors
from forecasts of a spectrum of trend-chasing strategies. The new sentiment indicator
correlates with classical investor sentiment indicators. Its advantage lies in its clear
interpretation as an example of demand shift without a fundamental rationalization.
Furthermore, it can be constructed for a much longer time period for which other senti-
ment indicators are not available. The novel way of constructing investor sentiment
and differences of opinion can be applied to various asset markets, as long as asset price
is available. Second, I empirically show that both investor sentiment and differences of
opinion forecast skewness in daily aggregate stock market returns. In particular, the
role of differences of opinion depends on the states of average investor sentiment: it
positively forecasts market skewness in a optimistic state, but negatively forecasts it
in a pessimistic state. I provide an explanation for the role of difference of opinion by
augmenting the theory of Abreu and Brunnermeier (Econometrica 2003) with hetero-
3
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geneous beliefs among trend-chasing investors. I argue that convergence of opinions
among trend-chasers in a bullish state indicates that the price run-up is unlikely to be
sustained since fewer investors can remain net buyers in the future. Therefore rational
arbitragers coordinate their attack on the bubble, leading to a market crash. Vice versa,
the convergence of opinion in a bearish state promotes coordinated purchases among
rational arbitragers, leading to a strong recovery.
Illusory Profitability of Technical Analysis?
Investor sentiment as biased belief may stem from psychological bias such as over-
confidence, confirmation bias, etc. It can also come from incapability of conducting
proper statistical inference. One inference problem is that agents tend to ignore the
extensive search conducted before inference, leading to data mining bias. Chapter
2 (“How Illusory is the Profitability of Technical Analysis?”) empirically investigates
whether the often-held belief among investors about the usefulness of technical analysis
as a useful market timing tool is a biased belief, where the bias stems mainly from data
mining bias.
The profitability of technical trading rules is a conundrum. On the one hand, technical
analysis only needs public available information like asset prices. If the market is
(weakly) efficient, as widely believed among financial economists, rational investors
should quickly arbitrage away the profits, and therefore leave no room for technical
analysis. Yet at least 90% of experienced traders place some weight on it in costly
trading activity [Taylor and Allen (1992)].
Empirical evidence is more supportive for the technical analysis, which seems to resolve
this conundrum to a high extent. For example, Park and Irwin (2007) surveys 95 modern
studies and finds that 56 studies report profitability, 20 studies report negative results,
while the rest indicate mixed results. These results, when taken at face value, tend
to reject the market efficiency hypothesis and lend support for the traders’ practice.
Economists at large maintain that the profitability of technical analysis is illusory and
the empirical evidence is mostly due to data mining bias. For example, Jensen (1967)
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highlights this problem:
... if we begin to test various mechanical trading rules on the data we
can be virtually certain that if we try enough rules with enough variants
we will eventually find one or more which would have yielded profits (even
adjusted for any risk differentials) superior to a buy-and-hold policy. But,
and this is the crucial question, does this mean the same trading rule will
yield superior profits when actually put into practice?
In this chapter we highlight the danger of data mining bias by quantifying its effect
using several recently developed statistical tests. These tests enable us to identify
not only whether the best trading strategy is profitable, but also how many seemingly
profitable strategies have genuine predictive ability or pure luck. Studying 25988 trad-
ing strategies for emerging foreign exchange markets, we find thousands of profitable
rules if we ignore the data snooping bias. The profitability disappears, however, when
data snooping bias is taken into account. Our results indicate that the profitability
of technical analysis documented in the literature is vastly overstated due to data
snooping bias, and the belief of many investors is biased due to the incapability of
correct inference.
We also show that out-of-sample tests in such a context have substantial data snooping
bias. Such tests are often proposed as an effective way to alleviate the bias due to
data mining. However, when investors search for profitable trading strategies both
in-sample and out-of-sample, out-of-sample tests become vulnerable to data snooping
too. We highlight this danger in our empirical study.
The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator under Structural Instability
In Chapter 3 (“A Reappraisal of the Leading Indicator Properties of the Yield Curve in
the Presence of Structural Instability”), we provide an extensive re-examination of the
leading indicator properties of the yield curve in four major developed countries.
5
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Term spread (difference between the long- and short-term interest rate) is among the
most prominent financial variables for predicting real activity. An inverted yield curve
is commonly believed to signal recessions [See e.g. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and
more recent work by Hamilton and Kim (2002) or Stock and Watson (2003)]. However,
recent literature has raised the concern that the predictive performance of the term
spread may be time-variant and that predictive regressions based on the yield spread
may be subject to substantial model instability (Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich, 2003).
The economic rationale for the potential instability stems from, for instance, the form
of the monetary policy reaction function or the relative importance of real and nominal
shocks in the economy. As these factors potentially change substantially over time (e.g.,
a change in monetary policy regime), it raises the need to investigate the time-variation
of the forecasting relationship in greater detail.
We provide an extensive reexamination of the leading indicator properties of the yield
curve in environments characterized by model instability. Unlike the well studied
and established in-sample predictive performance of the yield curve, our approach
focuses explicitly on its time-varying out-of-sample (OOS) forecasting properties. This
is of particular relevance, since one may argue that the ultimate concern of market
participants and policy makers is out-of-sample forecast accuracy as well as a good
predictive performance towards the end of the sample period.
We find that there is a substantial time-variation in the out-of-sample forecast perfor-
mance of the yield curve for real activity. Moreover, we document that the information
contained in the yield curve has substantially declined in past years, which has not
been shown in the literature before. This finding holds true for all countries considered.
To shed some light on potential reasons for the time-variation of predictive power and
forecast breakdowns, we use several modern (in-sample) tests for parameter stability
and link identified break dates to real and nominal shocks. Using these econometric
tools, we provide strong evidence for structural instabilities that affect the predictive
relationship.
Our paper raises the fundamental question whether the yield spread can still be
6
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regarded as a reliable leading indictor in the presence of structural instability. For
the purpose of reexamining the leading indicator properties under structural change,
we employ optimal window selection techniques, which are designed for forecasting
in unstable environments. We find that newly developed methods for forecasting in
the presence of structural change generally help improve forecast accuracy. However,
this does not change our conclusion that the yield curve has been losing its edge as a
predictor of real activity in recent years.
7

CHAPTER 1
SENTIMENT, CONVERGENCE OF OPINION, AND
MARKET CRASH
ABSTRACT
I introduce a novel proxy of investor sentiment and differences of opinion among
trend-chasing investors to forecast skewness in daily aggregate stock market returns.
The new proxy is an easy-to-construct, real-time measure available at different fre-
quencies for more than a century. Empirically I find that negative skewness is most
pronounced when investors have experienced high sentiment. The role of differences
of opinion depends on the states of average investor sentiment: it positively forecasts
market skewness in an optimistic state, but negatively forecasts it in a pessimistic
state. Conceptually, I provide an explanation for the role of differences of opinion by
augmenting the theory of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) with heterogeneous beliefs
among trend-chasing investors. I argue that convergence of opinion in an optimistic
state indicates that the price run-up is unlikely to be sustained since fewer investors
can remain net buyers in the future. Therefore rational arbitrageurs coordinate their
attack on the bubble, leading to a market crash. Vice versa, the convergence of opinion
in a pessimistic state promotes coordinated purchases among rational arbitrageurs,
leading to a strong recovery.
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“When everyone thinks alike, everyone is likely to be wrong”
Neill (1997)
1.1 Introduction
Asymmetry is prevalent in stock returns. In particular, market returns “go up by the
stairs and down by the elevator”. This phenomena mirrors the empirical evidence of
negative skewness, which is often taken as a measure of crash risk for the aggregate
stock market [e.g., Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), Hong and Stein (2003)]. Several
theories have been proposed to explain the economic mechanism underlying the ob-
served skewness. Most of the empirical literature, however, is unable to establish these
economic links for the aggregate market return.
In this paper I study the role of investor sentiment and differences of opinion in forecast-
ing skewness in the aggregate daily stock market returns. Motivated by experimental,
empirical, and survey evidence that investors chase the trend,1 I derive both measures
of investor sentiment and differences of opinion from forecasts of a spectrum of com-
monly used trend following trading strategies. I find that negative (positive) skewness
is most pronounced when investors have experienced high (low) sentiment. The role
of differences of opinion depends on the states of average investor sentiment: when
trend-chasing investors are on average pessimistic, differences of opinion negatively
forecast market skewness; when they are on average optimistic, differences of opinion
positively forecast market skewness. These results hold regardless of whether or not
investors are allowed to learn and select desired trading strategies based on various
measures of past performance.
Why investor sentiment? Our history has witnessed investor manias during famous
bubbles, such as the Tulip mania and the South Sea Company bubble, which were
1See Andreassen and Kraus (1988), Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and Van de Velden (2005), and
Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) for examples of experimental evidence, and Frankel and Froot
(1988), Taylor and Allen (1992) and Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004) for survey evidence. Griffin, Harris, and
Topaloglu (2006) show that the actual trades of day traders follow the trend.
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followed by a crash. The notion of “Irrational Exuberance” in Shiller (2005) suggests
that investors are inspired by past performances of stock market and become more
optimistic, bidding up prices further. As the price cannot deviate too much from the
fundamental, this eventually leads to a crash. Therefore, one would expect that high
investor sentiment predicts a subsequent crash, which is confirmed by my findings.
The role of differences of opinion is much more controversial. Theoretical models of
differences of opinion deliver different predictions. Hong and Stein (2003) predict that
disagreement intensity decreases skewness, while Xu (2007) predicts that it increases
skewness. Empirical studies fail to find that detrended turnover, a proxy for differences
of opinion, forecasts market skewness. Unlike those studies, I focus on differences
of opinion among trend-chasing investors and examine its implication for skewness.
To this end, I construct a new measure of differences of opinion from the forecasts of
trend-following trading strategies. Furthermore, I conjecture that the role of differences
of opinion can change in different regimes of average investor sentiment. Intuitively, a
situation in which almost everyone believes the market will go down has conceivably
different implications for the market movement than a situation in which almost
everyone believes the market will go up, although the differences of opinion are very
low in both cases. My empirical evidence supports this conjecture.
What explains the distinct role of disagreement across sentiment regimes? I argue
that differences of opinion resemble the sustainability of bubbles/market downturn,
facilitating the coordination among rational arbitragers. Two key ingredients underlie
this argument: limited wealth or margin restriction of investors and the synchroniza-
tion problem of rational arbitragers. Investors usually have limited wealth or margin
restrictions and cannot buy/sell without limitations. They hold one of the following
beliefs: bearish, bullish, or neutral, which can be changed when observing new price
information. Arbitragers can attack a bubble, but they have difficulty in temporally
coordinating their strategies since they do not know when others will attack. Bub-
bles persist due to this synchronization problem [Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)].
I augment this theory with heterogeneous beliefs among trend-chasing investors. I
argue that convergence of opinions among trend-chasing investors can help rational
11
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arbitrageurs to coordinate their actions. The intuition is the following: when almost
everyone is optimistic, the average belief is positive and the dispersion of beliefs is very
small. Since the investors who became optimistic at an early stage have fully invested
during a bubble, fewer investors can continue to buy. A bubble is therefore unlikely to
be sustained. Understanding the absence of further momentum, and understanding
that other rational arbitragers are likely to perceive it in a similar way, rational arbi-
tragers can coordinate their attack on the bubble. If they do, a market crash is expected.
On the other hand, when the average belief is positive, a high dispersion of beliefs
implies that many trend-following investors have neutral or bearish beliefs, which can
become bullish to fuel the rally when the price continues to increase. Therefore, the
bubble can be sustained, and rational arbitragers are likely to choose to ride the bubble.
Similarly, the convergence of opinion in the low sentiment period indicates that the
market downturn is unlikely to be sustained, so the rational arbitragers coordinate to
buy. As a result, a strong rebound is expected.
Constructing a sentiment indicator from forecasts of trend-following strategies deserves
a more in-depth explanation. First, forecasts of trend-following trading strategies are
widely held as deviations from fundamentals. Theoretical papers often take technical
analysis as an example of investor sentiment [e.g., Shleifer and Summers (1990)].
Empirically, although earlier studies often report significant profitability by applying
technical analysis, recent studies show that little profitability remains once the data
snooping bias is controlled for [e.g., Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999)]. It
is therefore appealing that forecasts of trend-following trading strategies represent
investor sentiment rather than changes in fundamentals. I empirically validate this con-
jecture by showing significant correlations between trend-chasing sentiment and other
common proxies of investor sentiment. Second, forecasts of trend-following trading
strategies capture the sentiment of a wide range of people, such as technical analysts,
investors who pick their stocks according to the recommendation of newsletters2, or
investors who entrust their money to other trend-followers.
2In his interview with Forbes, the editor of Investor’s Intelligence stated that: “Most [newsletters] are
trend followers...”. See Forbes.com, March 19, 2002.
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The new proxy of investor sentiment and disagreement is an easy-to-construct, real-
time measure, which is available at different frequencies for more than a century. It
enables me to study interesting episodes, such as the Roaring Twenties and the Great
Depression, whereas other commonly-used proxies, such as closed-end fund discounts
are available only since the 1960s. It can be potentially useful for testing models of
investor sentiment and differences of opinion for various asset markets as well as other
countries, especially when other proxies are sparse.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 contains a brief overview
of literature. Section 1.3 presents the data and the universe of the trading strategies.
Section 1.4 discusses empirical results on the forecasting ability of sentiment and
differences of opinion. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature
A number of theories have been proposed within a representative agent framework to
explain negative skewness in aggregate stock market returns. Early models include the
leverage effect, the volatility feedback effect and the stochastic bubble. The leverage
effect [Black (1976) and Christie (1982)] suggests that the financial and operating lever-
age of the firm rises when its stock price drops, followed by an increase in subsequent
stock return volatility. When the stock price increases, however, the return volatility
is reduced due to a decline in the leverage. The asymmetric response of volatility to
change in return renders negative skewness. Alternative theories by Pindyck (1984),
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), and Campbell and Hentschel (1992) propose
a volatility feedback effect by relating volatility and risk premium to the arrival of
either good or bad news. Both good news and bad news increase volatility, and hence
the risk premium. However, the risk premium offsets good news while amplifying bad
news, resulting in a deeper drop at the arrival of bad news than of good news. The
stochastic bubble theory by Blanchard and Watson (1982) postulates that negative
skewness arises from the popping of bubbles, a rare event that leads to very large
negative returns.
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Hong and Stein (2003) deviate from the previous models by incorporating heterogeneity
among agents. They explain skewness through the revelation of bad news hidden
by short-sales constraints when investors hold different opinions. Since the higher
the dispersion of beliefs, the higher trading volume will be, this model implies that
trading volume negatively forecasts skewness. Xu (2007) adopts a similar framework,
but investors disagree on the precision of a publicly observed signal. He shows that
the equilibrium asset price is a convex function of the signal, due to the different
information sensitivity of high and low precision investors. The model predicts that
disagreement intensity increases contemporaneous skewness.
The empirical literature, however, is unable to establish these links for the aggregate
market return. For example, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), Hueng and McDonald
(2005), and Charoenrook and Daouk (2008) do not find that detrended turnover forecasts
market skewness.3 Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Xu (2007) find a negative
relationship between skewness and past returns, which is consistent with the stochastic
bubble theory of Blanchard and Watson (1982) and the price convexity theory of Xu
(2007). However, Charoenrook and Daouk (2008) find returns are more negatively
skewed following an increase in stock prices and are more positively skewed following a
decrease in stock prices. They argue that these findings cannot be coherently explained
by leverage effect and volatility feedback effect theories, which predict more negatively
skewed returns following a stock price decline; this is only partly consistent with the
stochastic bubble theory, which predicts more negatively skewed returns following a
period of stock price increase.
This paper relates to the literature on the asset pricing implications of investor senti-
ment. Empirical studies have examined the role of investor sentiment for near-term
and long-term returns, volatility and trading volume. One challenge of these studies
arises from the difficulty of measuring sentiment. As a belief unjustified by fundamen-
tals, sentiment is usually not directly observable. Existing literature has relied on
proxies such as closed-end fund discounts [Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)], consumer
3Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Charoenrook and Daouk (2008) find that detrended turnover forecasts
conditional skewness of individual stocks.
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confidence index [Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Qiu and Welch (2006)]. Other
papers call for the use of investor survey as a direct measure [see Brown and Cliff
(2005), Qiu and Welch (2006)]. Unlike those papers, this paper constructs a novel
sentiment indicator from forecasts of popular technical trading rules. The advantage of
using trend-following forecasts lies in its clear interpretation as an example of demand
shift without a fundamental rationalization. Furthermore, it can be simulated as long
as the past asset price information is available, and thus has the potential to expand
investor sentiment data to a longer history and more countries.
This paper can also be viewed as an empirical test for the economic impact of technical
trading. Technical analysis attempts to use past prices and perhaps other related
summary statistics to forecast price movements in order to make investment decisions.
It has enjoyed wide popularity among traders for a long time. Existing literature on
technical analysis focuses almost exclusively on the profitability of various trading
rules and the implications for market efficiency. In contrast, I focus on how technical
trading can be related to skewness of aggregate stock return, which has not yet been
studied empirically in the literature.4
1.3 Data
I consider three samples in this paper. The baseline sample is the Dow Jones Industry
Average (DJIA) between January 1952 and December 2008. The DJIA is available
for a longer sample period. However, to construct a refined sentiment index (which
is explained below), the daily federal fund rate is needed to obtain the excess return.
As it has only been available since 1952, it puts constraint on the length of the base-
line sample. To examine the robustness of the emprical findings, DJIA (1900-1951)
is used as a “hold-out” sample, although the refined sentiment indicator is not con-
sidered. For an additional out-of-sample test, I conduct the same analysis on the
S&P 500 index between 1964 and 2008. Both the DJIA (1952-2008) and the S&P
4A notable exception is Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008), who argue that negative skewness in
the currency market is due to a sudden unwinding of carry trades. Nagel (2004) also studies the impact
of trading strategies, though his focus is on trading volume.
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500 index are obtained from Datastream. The DJIA (1900-1951) is downloaded from
http://www.analyzeindices.com/dow-jones-history.shtml. The daily federal funds rate
is from the Federal Reserve Bank.
Dependent Variables
I use the “coefficient of skewness” as my baseline measure of skewness. It is calculated
using the daily return from t+ 1 to t+ h as follows:
SKEWNESS =
1
h
∑t+h
i=t+1(ri − r)3(
1
h
∑t+h
i=t+1(ri − r)2
)3/2 (1.1)
where h is the number of observations during this period, ri is the daily return at time
i, and r is the average daily return over this period. Note that a large negative value of
SKEWNESS corresponds to a left skewed distribution, indicating that market return
during this period is more “crash prone”.
Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), I use an alternative measure of asymmetry
of stock returns, denoted as DUVOL for “down-to-up volatility”. To calculate DUVOL
from time t+ 1 to t+h, I first obtain the average return for this period. Then I separate
the days during this period into a group whose daily return is above the average return
(up days) and a group whose daily return is below the average returns (down days).
DUVOL is then computed as the log of the ratio of the standard deviation on the down
days to the one on the up days:
DUVOL = log
{
(nu − 1)
∑
DOWN (ri − r)2
(nd − 1)
∑
UP (ri − r)2
}
(1.2)
where nu and nd are the number of days in up days group and down days group. The
use of DUVOL is motivated by the concern that, for a relatively small sample, the
calculation of SKEWNESS above is prone to estimation errors from calculating third
moments. DUVOL, on the other hand, involves only the estimation of second moments,
which therefore mitigates this concern.
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Throughout this paper, I consider predicting skewness or DUVOL over 30 days horizon
unless otherwise stated. Admittedly, the choice of this particular forecast horizon is
somewhat arbitrary. It rather reflects an attempt to balance two considerations: on the
one hand, shorter horizon is in principle deemed more interesting [Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2001)]; on the other hand, estimation of skewness variables over such a horizon
invites estimation errors. Table 1.1 shows that the average skewness (DUVOL) over
30 days of daily returns is slightly positive (negative). Their standard deviations are
usually high relative the mean, indicating high variations over time. Also, SKEWNESS
and DUVOL are notably highly correlated with a negative coefficient of -95%, as shown
in Table 1.2. This result is similar to the findings in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001).
Table 1.2 also shows that Skewness is negatively correlated with the return over past
30 days. Taken at face value, it suggests that a smaller skewness follows a higher past
return, which is consistent with the stochastic bubble theory of Blanchard and Watson
(1982) and the price convexity theory of Xu (2007).
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics. “Return" refers to the daily gross return of DJIA (in
percentage). “SD” is the standard deviation of returns from time t to t + 30. “SKEWNESS” and
“DUVOL" are the measures of return asymmetry calculated using the daily return from time t to t+ 30
according to Equation 1.1 and 1.2. “Sentiment" and “Disagreement” are the (equally weighted) average
and the standard deviation of the forecasts from the trading strategies for time t. “Sentiment_w” and
“Disagreement_w” are the average and the standard deviation of the forecasts weighted according to
the past two years of excess returns. Note that performance-weighted forecasts are re-scaled by 1000
times for the ease of reporting coefficients in the regression studies.
Return_30 SD_30 Skewness DUVOL Sentiment Disagreement Sentiment_w Disagreement_w
Mean 0.006 0.008 0.009 -0.019 0.191 0.850 0.216 1.441
Std. Dev. 0.052 0.005 0.557 0.331 0.445 0.123 0.816 0.998
Min -0.387 0.002 -4.372 -1.661 -0.845 0.449 -4.330 0.297
Max 0.188 0.057 3.598 2.111 0.886 0.998 3.125 12.870
Skewness -0.917 4.475 -0.786 0.117 -0.423 -0.782 -0.475 2.939
Kurtosis 6.721 37.387 6.713 3.510 1.975 2.701 3.611 19.810
Sentiment and Disagreement
I construct new measures of investor sentiment and differences of opinion from a
spectrum of trading strategies. Admittedly, the choice of the universe of trading
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Table 1.2: Correlation Coefficient Matrix
This table presents the correlation coefficient matrix. “Return_30” is the gross return over the period
of t− 30 to t. “SD_30” is the standard deviation of daily return from time t− 30 to t. “Skewness” and
“DUVOL” are the measures of return asymmetry calculated using the daily return from time t to t+ 30
according to Equation 1.1 and 1.2. “Sentiment” and “Disagreement” is the (equally weighted) average
and the standard deviation of forecast from the trading strategies for time t. “Sentiment_W” and
“Disagreement_w” is the average and the standard deviation of the forecasts weighted according to
the past two years excess returns. Note that performance-weighted forecasts are re-scaled by 1000
times for the ease of reporting coefficients in the regression studies.
Variables Return_30 SD_30 Skewness DUVOL Sentiment Disagreement Sentiment_w Disagreement_w
Return_30 1.000
SD_30 -0.354 1.000
Skewness -0.137 0.061 1.000
DUVOL 0.153 -0.078 -0.951 1.000
Sentiment 0.707 -0.359 -0.237 0.255 1.000
Disagreement -0.258 0.132 0.121 -0.127 -0.429 1.000
Sentiment_w 0.516 -0.262 -0.206 0.215 0.727 -0.276 1.000
Disagreement_w -0.030 -0.038 0.075 -0.072 -0.069 0.277 -0.143 1.000
strategies is to some extent at the disposal of the researchers. To avoid the concern
that the empirical results are driven by choosing a desired trading universe, I simply
use the same universe of trading rules as in Qi and Wu (2006), which nests nearly all
the trading rules studied in the top three finance journals. These trading rules have
been in use for a long time, and are used in current financial web sites such as Yahoo
Finance. They also enjoy wide popularity among the finance media such as the Wall
Street Journal and the Financial Times.
More specifically, the trading rule universe includes Filter Rules, Moving Average,
Trading Range Break (or Support and Resistance) Rules, and Channel Breakout Rules.
As is common in the technical analysis literature, all these trading strategies generate
one of the three trading recommendations, which assumes a value of 1 (buy signal), 0
(no position recommended), or -1 (sell signal). These strategies have been used for a
long time, and have frequently been studied in the literature5. The total number of
strategies I consider is 2127. The definitions of these trading strategies follow Sullivan,
Timmermann, and White (1999) and Qi and Wu (2006). For detailed definitions, please
refer to the appendix in Chapter 2. The parameters of these trading rules are provided
in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
5More discussions of these trading strategies can be found in Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999)
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I consider two ways of constructing the measures of investor sentiment and differences
of opinion. The first one, denoted as “SENTIMENT” throughout the paper, is a simple
average of forecasts from all the trading strategies at each time t. This amounts to
assigning an equal weight to each trading strategy, without taking its past performance
into account. Similarly, “DISAGREEMENT” is obtained as the standard deviation
(a common measure of differences of opinion in the literature) of the forecasts from
all the trading strategies. Alternatively, to capture the idea that better performing
strategies are more likely to be used, I construct a refined indicator of sentiment
and differences of opinion, which weights the trading signals according to the past
performance of the corresponding strategy. More concretely, for each time t, the weight
for each trading strategy with a positive mean excess return (over the daily federal
fund rate) in the evaluation period equals the proportion of the mean excess return
relative to the sum of mean excess returns from all these profitable strategies. The
unprofitable strategies during the two-year evaluation period are weighted with zero. I
use “SENTIMENT_W” hereafter to denote the sentiment weighted by two-year mean
excess returns. “DISAGREEMENT_W” is analogously defined.
An inspection of Table 1.1 shows that the mean of SENTIMENT and the SENTI-
MENT_W are both positive6, indicating that the forecasts from trend-following strate-
gies are on average optimistic. The correlation between SENTIMENT and SENTI-
MENT_W is as high as 73%. Both SENTIMENT and SENTIMENT_W are highly
correlated with the skewness variables, with an absolute value of correlation coefficient
larger than 25%. DISAGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT_W, on the other hand,
have much lower correlations with the skewness variables. Note that trend chasing
strategies are likely to have positive signals if past returns increase. Therefore one
would expect SENTIMENT and SENTIMENT_W to be positively correlated with the
past 30 days of return. I find a correlation coefficient of 71% and 52%, respectively.
This strongly suggests a need to control for the past returns if one wants to isolate the
effects of sentiment and disagreement beyond the past returns.
6Note that performance-weighted forecasts are rescaled by 1000 times to facilitate reporting coefficients
in the regression studies.
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Validation of Sentiment Indicator
To validate the new investor sentiment indicator, I provide its pairwise correlation
with other commonly used proxies for investor sentiment. These sentiment proxies
include lagged value-weighted dividend premium, IPO volume, lagged first-day return
on IPOs, lagged NYSE turnover from NYSE Factbook, closed-end fund discount, and
new issued debt and equity. Baker and Wurgler (2007) provide detailed descriptions and
discussions of these variables.7 These sentiment indicators are at monthly frequency
and available since the 1950s or the 1960s till 12/2005. I also consider the top-down
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2007) based on first principal component
of above six (standardized) sentiment proxies over 1962-2005 data. In addition, I
include the monthly Consumer Confidence Index between Jan. 1978 and Dec. 2008,
which is obtained from the Michigan Consumer Research Center, and a weekly Bull-
Bear spread from Lowerrisk.com. Consumer confidence index has been considered
as a sentiment indicator by Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Qiu and Welch
(2006), among others. The Bull-Bear spread is calculated as the difference between
the proportion of investors holding bullish opinion and the proportion of investors
holding bearish opinions. It is based on the weekly investor sentiment data from an
online survey conducted by Lowerrisk.com from May, 1997 to July, 2006. To calculate
the correlation with other monthly sentiment indicators, I consider the third version
of the new sentiment index, “SENTIMENT_AVG”, which is the monthly average of
daily SENTIMENT. As other sentiment variables, except the Bull-Bear spread, are
in monthly frequency, both SENTIMENT and SENTIMENT_W are taken at the end
of the month.8 In order to obtain the correlation with the Bull-Bear spread, both
SENTIMENT and SENTIMENT_W are taken on the same day as the survey day.
Table 1.3 reports the correlation coefficient and the p-value from testing the null
hypothesis that two sentiment indicators are independent. It shows that all three
versions of new sentiment indicator significantly correlate with other investor sentiment
7I thank Jeffrey Wurgler for providing these data at his web page.
8Similar correlations are obtained when SENTIMENT and SENTIMENT_W are taken at the beginning of
the month.
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indicators, with the corresponding p-value almost always smaller than 1%. The signs
of the coefficients are expected since higher values of lagged value-weighted dividend
premium and closed-end fund discount proxy for lower investor sentiment, whereas
higher values of other indicators proxy for higher investor sentiment. There is also a
significant and positive correlation between the new sentiment index and the top-down
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2007), which is perceived to be less prone to the
noise in individual sentiment indicators. Remarkably, the correlation of the Bull-Bear
spread with the new sentiment indicator is about 40%. Since the Bull-Bear spread is
from an online survey, it provides a more convincing validation of the new sentiment
through direct opinions of investors (similar arguments can be found in Qiu and Welch
(2006)).
1.4 Empirical Results
In this section I examine the role of the investor sentiment and differences of opinion
in forecasting skewness of market return. I start with a sorting-based approach, which
examines the skewness in different quintiles of sentiment and disagreement. Then I
proceed with a regression-based analysis to account for potential effects from control
variables. The empirical results are better explained when results from both approaches
are taken together.
1.4.1 Skewness in Different Quintiles of Sentiment and Disagreement
I use Skewt+ht to denote SKEWNESS or DUVOL of DJIA calculated from daily returns
from t to t+ h (see Equation 1.1 and 1.2). I sort Skewt+ht by SENTIMENT at time t into
quintiles of equal number of observations, with quintile 1 as the lowest quintile and
quintile 5 as the highest quintile. For each quintile, the mean of Skewt+ht within the
quintile is reported. I also report a “t” statistic obtained from testing whether mean
Skewt+ht equals zero. A similar sorting procedure is applied to DISAGREEMENT, and
the corresponding mean of Skewt+ht and t-statistics are calculated.
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Table 1.4: Breakdown by Sorts of Sentiment and Disagreement
This table reports the break-down results for dependent variables in each quintile of SENTIMENT
or DISAGREEMENT. “SKEWNESS_30” (“SKEWNESS_60”) is the skewness (Equation 1.1) of daily
return obtained from time t to t+ 30 (t+ 60). “DUVOL_30” (“DUVOL_60”) is the DUVOL (Equation
1.2) of daily return obtained from time t to t+ 30 (t+ 60). Panel A of this table reports the average
SKEWNESS or DUVOL when SENTIMENT is sorted into quintiles of equal number of observations.
“t-stat” is the t-value obtained from testing whether the mean of SKEWNESS/DUVOL equals zero.
Panel B reports similar results when the sorting procedure is applied to the DISAGREEMENT.
Panel A: Sort by SENTIMENT
SKEWNESS_30 DUVOL_30 SKEWNESS_60 DUVOL_60
Quintile mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
1 0.20 21.82 -0.14 -23.29 0.20 21.36 -0.13 -24.79
2 0.08 7.99 -0.06 -10.10 0.04 4.45 -0.03 -7.18
3 -0.03 -2.93 0.00 0.26 -0.08 -6.62 0.02 3.63
4 -0.11 -10.25 0.06 9.77 -0.15 -13.86 0.07 14.71
5 -0.17 -15.53 0.09 14.75 -0.30 -21.00 0.13 23.85
Panel B: Sort by DISAGREEMENT
SKEWNESS_30 DUVOL_30 SKEWNESS_60 DUVOL_60
Quintile mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
1 -0.12 -10.99 0.06 9.44 -0.25 -17.28 0.10 17.41
2 -0.03 -2.74 0.00 0.44 -0.07 -6.12 0.02 3.30
3 0.01 0.91 -0.02 -3.32 -0.02 -2.00 -0.00 -0.79
4 0.04 4.22 -0.04 -6.29 0.02 1.61 -0.02 -5.03
5 0.06 5.90 -0.05 -8.30 0.03 2.83 -0.03 -6.62
Table 1.4 reports the results for Skewt+ht of 30 days and 60 days of the baseline sample
(DJIA, 1952-2008).9 Panel A indicates that as the SENTIMENT becomes larger, the
SKEWNESS declines uniformly, suggesting that the higher the sentiment, the more
likely the crash will be. When the investor sentiment is in the highest quintile (quintile
5), the average 30 days skewness is -0.17, about twenty times higher in absolute value
than the unconditional skewness (0.009 in Table 1.1). An increase in DISAGREEMENT
in Panel B corresponds to a decline of SKEWNESS. Notably, when DISAGREEMENT
is in the lowest quintile, the average SKEWNESS is much lower than the other four
quintiles, showing higher crash risk. Similar results are obtained for DUVOL with an
9Similar results can be found for the SKEWNESS/DUVOL for other length of trading days, and for the
other two samples: DJIA (1900-1951) and S&P 500 (1964-2008).
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expected reverse pattern.
The monotonic relationship between skewness and disagreement obscures the possible
role of the investor sentiment. Differences of opinion are very low both in the very high
sentiment period and very low sentiment period. Intuitively, however, a situation with
almost everyone believes the market will go up has considerable different implication
than a situation that almost everyone believes the market will go down. Motivated by
this intuition, I report the mean skewness and the t-value when the SENTIMENT is
above zero (optimistic state) or below zero (pessimistic state).
Table 1.5: Breakdown by Sorts of Disagreement in Different States of Sentiment
This table reports the break-down results for dependent variables conditional on SENTIMENT is
below zero (pessimistic state) or above zero (optimistic state). “SKEWNESS_30” (“SKEWNESS_60”)
is the skewness (Equation 1.1) of daily return obtained from time t to t + 30 (t + 60). “DUVOL_30”
(“DUVOL_60”) are the DUVOL (Equation 1.2) of daily return obtained from time t to t+ 30 (t+ 60).
Panel A of this table reports the average SKEWNESS or DUVOL when DISAGREEMENT is sorted
into quintiles of equal number of observations and when the average sentiment is pessimistic. “t-stat”
is the t-value obtained from testing whether the mean of SKEWNESS/DUVOL equals zero. Panel
B reports similar results when DISAGREEMENT_W is sorted into quintiles of equal number of
observations and when the average sentiment is optimistic.
Panel B: Sort by DISAGREEMENT in Pessimistic State
SKEWNESS_30 DUVOL_30 SKEWNESS_60 DUVOL_60
Quintile mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
1 0.38 19.01 -0.28 -20.33 0.37 19.99 -0.24 -19.60
2 0.25 16.07 -0.18 -17.25 0.26 16.44 -0.17 -19.21
3 0.15 9.78 -0.10 -10.61 0.15 9.90 -0.10 -11.59
4 0.10 6.78 -0.06 -6.71 0.08 5.21 -0.05 -6.33
5 0.09 5.82 -0.06 -7.11 0.06 3.82 -0.05 -6.30
Panel A: Sort by DISAGREEMENT in Optimistic State
SKEWNESS_30 DUVOL_30 SKEWNESS_60 DUVOL_60
Quintile mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat mean t-stat
1 -0.19 -16.61 0.11 16.58 -0.33 -21.58 0.15 25.75
2 -0.14 -11.30 0.07 10.64 -0.20 -14.55 0.09 15.72
3 -0.07 -4.89 0.03 3.21 -0.12 -8.47 0.05 7.91
4 0.01 0.37 -0.02 -2.59 -0.02 -1.78 -0.01 -1.10
5 0.04 2.80 -0.04 -4.81 0.01 0.36 -0.02 -3.19
Table 1.5 reveals an interesting pattern. When trend-following investors are on average
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pessimistic (Panel A), an increase in DISAGREEMENT is associated with a monotonic
decline in SKEWNESS, indicating that the lower the disagreement, the more likely
a large rebound will occur. The positive SKEWNESS is particularly pronounced in
the lowest quintile, with a value of 0.38, i.e., more than forty times higher than the
unconditional skewness of 0.009 in Table 1.1. When trend-chasing investors are on
average optimistic (Panel B), DISAGREEMENT is in general positively(negatively)
associated with the SKEWNESS (DUVOL), which is just the opposite from the results in
Panel A. Relative to the unconditional skewness, the large negative average skewness
of -0.19 at the lowest quintile indicates that the crash risk is very high when the
disagreement is extremely low. These results suggest that a convergence of opinion is
likely to be associated with a crash in optimistic states. Nevertheless, these results are
still descriptive and ignore other potential predictors of skewness. Therefore, I now
turn to regression analysis for a more rigorous investigation.
1.4.2 Regression Analysis
Similar to Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), and Charoenrook and Daouk (2008), I use
standard predictive regressions to investigate the role of the sentiment and differences
of opinion for forecasting skewness of subsequent market returns. It takes the following
form:
Skewt+ht = β0 + β
′
1Xt + β
′
2Zt + 
t+h
t , (1.3)
where zt is either a measure of investor sentiment or differences of opinion or both. Xt
contains a vector of control variables similar to Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), such as
past returns and volatility of past returns.
Due to overlapping observations of the dependent variable, this approach is plagued
by econometric problems of serial correlation in the residuals. I adjust the p-value
using Newey-West standard errors [Newey and West (1987a)], which are robust against
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. I also consider a moving block bootstrap
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methodology, which is particularly suitable in a setting with highly dependent data.
The consistency of the MBB standard error estimator has recently been proven by
Goncalves and White (2005). MBB is a (non-parametric) bootstrap which draws blocks
of re-sampled observations randomly with replacement from the time series of original
observations, where the block length can be fixed or data-driven.10 The results are
similar when using different standard errors, so I only report Newey-West standard
errors for the sake of brevity.
Another potential concern is whether the dependent variables, the sentiment, and
disagreement variables contain a unit root. I provide the unit root test results for a
forecasting horizon of 30 days11 in table 1.6 for the baseline sample. Three unit root
tests have been conducted: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron test,
and the DF-GLS test, which performs a modified Dickey-Fuller t test for a unit root in
which the series has been transformed by a generalized least-squares regression. All
tests reject the existence of a unit root at the 1% level. The results for the other two
samples are qualitatively similar.
Table 1.6: Unit Root Test
This table presents the results from unit root tests. ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test,
PPerron is the Phillips-Perron unit-root test that a variable has a unit root, and DF-GLS performs a
modified Dickey-Fuller t test for a unit root in which the series has been transformed by a generalized
least-squares regression. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Tests SKEWNESS DUVOL SENTIMENT DISAGREEMENT SENTIMENT_W DISAGREEMENT_W
ADF -13.81∗∗∗ -13.07∗∗∗ -5.08∗∗∗ -10.17∗∗∗ -17.03∗∗∗ -14.87∗∗∗
PPerron -12.50∗∗∗ -11.99∗∗∗ -10.82∗∗∗ -16.19∗∗∗ -15.64∗∗∗ -11.40∗∗∗
DF-GLS -12.14∗∗∗ -10.57∗∗∗ -4.93∗∗∗ -2.58∗∗∗ -17.04∗∗∗ -15.06∗∗∗
10As recommended by Goncalves and White (2005), I use a data-driven block length, following the
procedure by Andrews (1991).
11Unit root tests become less significant as the forecasting horizon grows. Still, no unit root can be detected
for the horizons we considered (up to 360 days).
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Baseline Estimation Results
In the baseline estimation, I forecast Skew over thirty days’ with daily regressions
for the baseline sample (DJIA 1952-2008). In the regressions reported by Table 1.7,
I consider three sentiment states. “Both” indicates that the whole sample is used
for regression, while “Pessimistic”/“Optimistic” indicates that only the observations
with “SENTIMENT” below/above zero are considered. The first and fourth columns of
Panel A indicate that the investor sentiment has a strong forecasting ability for the
skewness for both specifications, with a negative sign and significant at the 1% level.
The higher the trend-following investor sentiment, the lower skewness will be, showing
a higher crash risk. Disagreement, however, does not have a significant incremental
predictive power for future skewness beyond sentiment when both sentiment states
are considered together. This stands in contrast to the theoretical predictions of Hong
and Stein (2003), but is consistent with the empirical findings of Chen, Hong, and Stein
(2001), Hueng and McDonald (2005), and Charoenrook and Daouk (2008), who find no
significant relationship between conditional skewness of aggregate market returns and
detrended turnover, a proxy for the extent of the differences of opinion.
Splitting the sample into optimistic state and pessimistic state reveals a differential
predictive role of DISAGREEMENT across different sentiment states. When investors
are on average pessimistic (second column in Panel A), DISAGREEMENT negatively
forecasts the subsequent skewness. This result, when taken at face value, seems to
support the model of Hong and Stein (2003), which predicts that higher differences of
opinion are related to a higher crash risk. Recall that, however, even in the highest
quintile of differences of opinion during a pessimistic state, the average skewness
is positive (Table 1.4). Therefore a higher disagreement does not seem to predict a
crash, which is by definition a large negative skewness. Instead, it is more evident that
convergence of opinion is associated with a higher conditional skewness (large rebound
in returns). Hence, I interpret the negative coefficient of DISAGREEMENT as evidence
that convergence of opinion in a pessimistic state forecasts a large rebound.
When trend-chasing investors are on average optimistic (third column of Panel A), the
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coefficient of DISAGREEMENT_W becomes positive. Since in the optimistic state, the
SKEWNESS is mostly negative in different quintiles (Table 1.4), the positive coefficient
is best interpreted as lower disagreement forecasting larger negative skewness. That
is, when trend-chasing investors’ opinions converge in an optimistic state, it forecasts a
subsequent higher crash risk. Taking the results in the optimistic state and pessimistic
state together, neither Hong and Stein (2003) nor Xu (2007) explains the findings in
the pessimistic and optimistic periods at the same time.
What explains the differential role of differences of opinion then? One explanation is
that differences of opinion reflect the sustainability of an ongoing bubble or market
downturn, which can be used by rational arbitragers to coordinate their attack at the
bubble/market downturn. Consider a market with rational arbitragers similar to Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), each of whom is small and unable to move the market alone.
Arbitragers have a synchronization problem in temporarily coordinating with other
rational arbitragers. For example, during a bubble period in which the average belief
is usually positive, the arbitrager has the option to either ride the bubble or attack
the bubble. Attacking a bubble can result in a loss if other arbitragers continue to buy.
Therefore, an arbitrager’s decision hinges upon her belief about what other arbitragers
will do. Note also that trend-chasing investors require a different extent of price change
to change their beliefs. For example, a 2% increase from a recent low in the stock
price may invite a long position from one trend follower, but may not be sufficient for
another investor to become bullish if she relies on at least a 3% increase to ensure her
confidence in an up-trend. The later investor can become a buyer if the price continues
to increase. A high dispersion of belief during an optimistic state among trend chasers
implies that many trend-following investors are of more pessimistic/neutral type, but
can subsequently become optimistic and then drive the price up further. The change of
belief is likely to happen because a recent positive return leads to a net buy by trend
followers (in line with the average optimistic sentiment), which can in turn push the
price higher, causing the yet non-optimistic types to become optimistic. Therefore, a
bubble is likely to be sustained when disagreement is high and trend chasers are on
average optimistic. In this case, the rational arbitragers are likely to choose to ride
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the bubble. By contrast, there is less of a chance for the price run-up to be sustained
when the dispersion of belief converges in an optimistic state. This is due to the fact
that fewer trend-following investors who still hold non-optimistic beliefs can join the
party, while previous optimistic investors have margin restrictions and used up their
buying capacity during the bubble. Understanding this, and understanding that other
rational arbitragers are likely to perceive the same way, the convergence of opinion
helps arbitragers to attack the bubble jointly. As a result, the market crashes. Vice
versa, the convergence of opinion in the low sentiment period indicates that the market
downturn is unlikely to be sustained and that the rational arbitragers coordinate to
buy, hence, a strong recovery is expected.
For the control variables, past returns in most cases do not have a significant fore-
casting power, which seems inconsistent with the findings in Chen, Hong, and Stein
(2001) that negative skewness is more pronounced following positive returns. However,
in untabulated regressions, once SENTIMENT and DISAGREEMENT are omitted
from the regression, past returns become significant and negative predictors of future
skewness. Results in Table 1.7 suggests that much of the effect from past returns has
been captured by the SENTIMENT and/or DISAGREEMENT when they are included
jointly in the regressions. Lagged SKEWNESS is positive and significant, indicating
persistency in the skewness. Volatility of past returns is included as in Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2001) to address the concern that SENTIMENT or DISAGREEMENT forecasts
volatility, which in turn is reflected in skewness such that we are probably forecasting
volatility instead of skewness. As argued by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), past realized
volatility is probably the best univariate predictor for future volatility, hence controlling
for it helps to alleviate this concern. Nevertheless, the coefficient of the volatility of
past returns is seldom significant.
Panel B of Table 1.7 reports results with DUVOL as a dependent variable following
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), which is calculated using daily returns over thirty
trading days. They corroborate well the findings with SKEWNESS as the dependent
variable. The signs of the coefficients on SENTIMENT and DISAGREEMENT are
opposite to those in Panel A, which is expected since SKEWNESS and DUVOL are
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highly negatively correlated. The opposite sign of the coefficients on DISAGREEMENT
in the second and third columns of Panel B confirms the differential role of differences
of opinion across pessimistic and optimistic states.
So far I have used the whole baseline sample to investigate the role of investor sentiment
and disagreement. To address the robustness of the results in different sub-samples,
I have conducted a sub-sample analysis by splitting the sample into two sub-periods:
before 1980 and after 1980, which divides the sample into roughly equal-sized sub-
samples. I find that the results in each sub-sample are qualitatively similar to the
whole sample analysis. Detailed results are not included for the sake of space, but are
available from the author upon request.
Another concern that may emerge is the extreme price movement on the “Black Mon-
day”, October 19, 1987, which might dominate the findings. In an untabulated regres-
sion which excludes October 1987, I find that the results virtually do not change.
Out-of-sample Test
As argued in the introduction, this paper has introduced a new way of constructing
investor sentiment and differences of opinion through commonly used technical trading
rules. Since the forecasts of trading rules need only past prices as the input, it enables
me to examine the roles of sentiment and disagreement in forecasting market skewness
as long as market index information is available. This greatly expands the potential
data for such an analysis since commonly used sentiment indicators go back only to the
1960s.
In the following, I examine the robustness of the results by conducting the same
analysis on the sample of DJIA between 1900 and 1951. This sample period includes
interesting episodes such as the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression.
Table 1.8 shows that the results are remarkably similar to those in Table 1.7. Investor
sentiment negatively (positively) predicts future SKEWNESS (DUVOL). The role of
differences of opinion depends on the average investor sentiment. It predicts nega-
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tively (positively) SKEWNESS (DUVOL) in a pessimistic state, but predicts positively
(negatively) in an optimistic state.
Past returns occasionally have positive significant coefficients when predicting future
market skewness. When both investor sentiment and differences of opinion are omitted
from the regression, past returns have again negative coefficients as in Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2001). Past volatility has a significant predictive power in all model specifications
compared to the weak predictive ability in the sample of DJIA during 1952-2008. It
indicates a higher crash risk when past return volatility is high. Similar findings can
be found in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001). Finally, the model fit reflected in Adjusted
R2 is similar to the one in Table 1.7, and comparable to the findings in Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2001).
Additional out-of-sample tests have been conducted for the S&P 500 index during 1964
to 2008. DJIA is computed from the stock prices of 30 of the largest and most widely
held public companies in the United States, which are presumably the most liquid
stocks. It is interesting to examine whether the above results hold for S&P 500, which
includes smaller firms and is hence less liquid than the DJIA.
Table 1.9 shows that the investor sentiment continues to be a strong predictor of future
return asymmetry, whose coefficient is significant at the 1% level when forecasting
either SKEWNESS or DUVOL. The predictive ability of DISAGREEMENT, on the
other hand, becomes quite weak. Nevertheless, the direction of predictive ability of
DISAGREEMENT remains the same as before, despite less statistical significance in
its coefficients. That is, it negatively (positively) predicts SKEWNESS (DUVOL) in
a pessimistic state, and positively (negatively) predicts SKEWNESS (DUVOL) in an
optimistic state. Note that the forecasting horizon is 30 days. When the forecasting
horizon is extended to 60 days, 90 days or 120 days, DISAGREEMENT regains its
significance, . Given the fact theoretical models do not provide guidance for the exact
choice of the forecasting horizon, and the observation that the signs of the coefficients
are the same for 30 days and longer forecasting horizons, I conclude that the results
based on S&P 500 are consistent with the findings based on DJIA. Nevertheless I
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report only results for a forecasting horizon of 30 days in the paper for the consistency
of exposition. Results for other forecasting horizons are available from the author upon
request.
Monthly regressions
The above regressions are conducted at a daily frequency. This has the advantage of
improving the statistical significance due to the large number of observations. Further-
more, investors are unlikely to care about crash risk only once a month, rather, they
get alert once they find it is likely to occur during their daily trading. Still, one may
argue that daily changes have more noise, and major episodes develop over months or
even years. I therefore run monthly regressions. Table 1.10 reports the results. The
SENTIMENT or DISAGREEMENT is taken at the end of month, while the SKEW-
NESS to be forecasted is from daily returns of the next 30 days. Although the statistical
significance becomes weaker, the monthly regression yields consistent results as in the
daily regression, indicating that the noise in daily returns or other variables cannot be
the reasons for driving the previous results.
Regressions with Refined Measures of Sentiment and Disagreement
Investors are likely to engage in model selection. They can choose the models with more
success in the past. Furthermore, investors who used unsuccessful trading rules can be
driven out of the market or intentionally stay out of the market. This implies that better
performing strategies are more likely to be used among trend-chasing investors. To
capture this idea, I construct a refined indicator of sentiment and differences of opinion,
which weights the trading signals according to the past performance of corresponding
strategies. I examine whether the predictive role of investor sentiment and differences
of opinion continue to hold for the refined measures.
Table 1.11 and Table 1.12 report the regression results for DJIA (1952-2008) and S&P
500 (1964-2008) respectively. The results for the DJIA (1900-1951) are not reported
34
SENTIMENT, CONVERGENCE OF OPINION, AND MARKET CRASH
Ta
bl
e
1.
9:
Fo
re
ca
st
in
g
th
e
A
gg
re
ga
te
St
oc
k
M
ar
ke
t
C
ra
sh
(S
&
P
50
0
In
de
x
19
64
-2
00
8)
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
ru
ns
fr
om
Ja
nu
ar
y
19
64
to
D
ec
em
be
r
20
08
an
d
is
ba
se
d
on
re
tu
rn
s
on
th
e
S&
P
50
0
In
de
x.
“B
ot
h”
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
w
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e
is
us
ed
fo
r
re
gr
es
si
on
,w
hi
le
“P
es
si
m
is
ti
c”
/“
O
pt
im
is
ti
c”
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
on
ly
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
w
it
h
“S
E
N
T
IM
E
N
T
”b
el
ow
/a
bo
ve
ze
ro
(p
es
si
m
is
ti
c/
op
ti
m
is
ti
c
st
at
e)
ar
e
co
ns
id
er
ed
.T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
SK
E
W
N
E
SS
(E
qu
at
io
n
1.
1)
or
D
U
V
O
L
(E
qu
at
io
n
1.
2)
of
da
ily
re
tu
rn
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
fr
om
t
to
t
+
3
0
.
“S
E
N
T
IM
E
N
T
”
an
d
“D
IS
A
G
R
E
E
M
E
N
T
”
ar
e
th
e
se
nt
im
en
t
an
d
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t
de
fin
ed
as
th
e
av
er
ag
e
an
d
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d
fo
re
ca
st
s
w
it
ho
ut
ta
ki
ng
pa
st
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
in
to
ac
co
un
t.
“s
ke
w
_p
as
t_
30
”
is
th
e
la
gg
ed
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
.“
R
et
ur
n_
30
”
is
th
e
gr
os
s
re
tu
rn
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
of
t
−
3
0
to
t,
an
d
“R
et
ur
n_
60
”
is
th
e
gr
os
s
re
tu
rn
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
of
t
−
6
0
to
t
−
3
0
.O
th
er
la
gg
ed
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
si
m
ila
rl
y
de
fin
ed
.“
SD
_p
as
t_
30
”
is
th
e
la
gg
ed
re
al
iz
ed
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n,
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
fr
om
th
e
da
il
y
re
tu
rn
s
be
tw
ee
n
t
−
3
0
an
d
t.
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
10
%
;*
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5%
;*
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
.
SK
E
W
N
E
SS
D
U
V
O
L
Se
nt
im
en
t
St
at
e
B
ot
h
Pe
ss
im
is
ti
c
O
pt
im
is
ti
c
B
ot
h
B
ot
h
Pe
ss
im
is
ti
c
O
pt
im
is
ti
c
B
ot
h
SE
N
T
IM
E
N
T
-0
.4
08
**
*
-0
.4
46
**
*
0.
22
5*
**
0.
24
7*
**
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
52
)
D
IS
A
G
R
E
E
M
E
N
T
-0
.5
28
0.
25
3
-0
.2
45
0.
37
8*
-0
.0
92
0.
14
7
(0
.3
70
)
(0
.2
68
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.2
17
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
12
)
SK
E
W
_p
as
t_
30
0.
11
7*
**
0.
18
8*
**
0.
08
7*
*
0.
11
0*
**
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
38
)
D
U
V
O
L
_p
as
t_
30
0.
14
0*
**
0.
21
1*
**
0.
10
9*
**
0.
13
3*
**
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
38
)
R
et
ur
n_
30
0.
17
2
-0
.5
77
-0
.3
12
0.
23
6
0.
08
0
0.
44
6
0.
50
8
0.
04
4
(0
.5
23
)
(0
.6
84
)
(0
.7
84
)
(0
.5
24
)
(0
.3
23
)
(0
.4
05
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.3
22
)
R
et
ur
n_
60
0.
53
3
0.
46
5
0.
10
1
0.
53
2
-0
.3
05
-0
.2
05
-0
.0
39
-0
.3
03
(0
.5
35
)
(0
.8
25
)
(0
.5
13
)
(0
.5
32
)
(0
.2
86
)
(0
.4
11
)
(0
.2
95
)
(0
.2
84
)
R
et
ur
n_
90
-0
.3
93
-0
.4
86
-0
.5
75
-0
.3
92
0.
21
7
0.
30
4
0.
33
0
0.
21
6
(0
.3
69
)
(0
.5
77
)
(0
.3
63
)
(0
.3
68
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.2
19
)
(0
.2
20
)
SD
_p
as
t_
30
-5
.2
53
-7
.9
53
*
1.
38
2
-5
.5
39
2.
97
6
5.
66
7*
*
-3
.1
90
3.
10
7
(3
.7
20
)
(4
.4
68
)
(7
.5
77
)
(3
.7
47
)
(2
.3
91
)
(2
.7
08
)
(3
.9
29
)
(2
.3
94
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
12
6*
**
0.
70
3*
*
-0
.2
80
0.
33
2*
*
-0
.0
85
**
*
-0
.4
88
**
*
0.
11
5
-0
.2
08
**
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.3
16
)
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.1
56
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.1
84
)
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.0
96
)
A
dj
us
te
d
R
2
0.
08
0.
08
0.
01
0.
08
0.
08
0.
08
0.
02
0.
08
N
11
21
2
34
24
77
82
11
21
2
11
21
2
34
24
77
82
11
21
2
35
SENTIMENT, CONVERGENCE OF OPINION, AND MARKET CRASH
Ta
bl
e
1.
10
:F
or
ec
as
ti
ng
th
e
A
gg
re
ga
te
St
oc
k
M
ar
ke
t
C
ra
sh
at
M
on
th
ly
F
re
qu
en
cy
(D
JI
A
19
52
-2
00
8)
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
ru
ns
fr
om
Ja
nu
ar
y
19
52
to
D
ec
em
be
r
20
08
an
d
is
ba
se
d
on
re
tu
rn
s
on
D
JI
A
.“
B
ot
h”
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
th
e
w
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e
is
us
ed
fo
r
re
gr
es
si
on
,w
hi
le
“P
es
si
m
is
ti
c”
/“
O
pt
im
is
ti
c”
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
on
ly
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
w
it
h
“S
E
N
T
IM
E
N
T
”
be
lo
w
/a
bo
ve
ze
ro
(p
es
si
m
is
ti
c/
op
ti
m
is
ti
c
st
at
e)
ar
e
co
ns
id
er
ed
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
S
K
E
W
N
E
S
S
(E
qu
at
io
n
1.
1)
or
D
U
V
O
L
(E
qu
at
io
n
1.
2)
of
da
il
y
re
tu
rn
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
fr
om
t
to
t
+
3
0
.
“S
E
N
T
IM
E
N
T
”
an
d
“D
IS
A
G
R
E
E
M
E
N
T
”
ar
e
th
e
se
nt
im
en
t
an
d
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
t
de
fin
ed
as
th
e
av
er
ag
e
an
d
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
eq
ua
lly
w
ei
gh
te
d
fo
re
ca
st
s
w
it
ho
ut
ta
ki
ng
pa
st
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
in
to
ac
co
un
t.
“s
ke
w
_p
as
t_
30
”
is
th
e
la
gg
ed
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
.“
R
et
ur
n_
30
”
is
th
e
gr
os
s
re
tu
rn
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
of
t
−
3
0
to
t,
an
d
“R
et
ur
n_
60
”
is
th
e
gr
os
s
re
tu
rn
ov
er
th
e
pe
ri
od
of
t
−
6
0
to
t
−
3
0
.O
th
er
la
gg
ed
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
si
m
ila
rl
y
de
fin
ed
.“
SD
_p
as
t_
30
”
is
th
e
la
gg
ed
re
al
iz
ed
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n,
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
fr
om
th
e
da
il
y
re
tu
rn
s
be
tw
ee
n
t
−
3
0
an
d
t.
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
10
%
;*
*
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5%
;*
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
.
SK
E
W
N
E
SS
D
U
V
O
L
Se
nt
im
en
t
St
at
e
B
ot
h
Pe
ss
im
is
ti
c
O
pt
im
is
ti
c
B
ot
h
B
ot
h
Pe
ss
im
is
ti
c
O
pt
im
is
ti
c
B
ot
h
SE
N
T
IM
E
N
T
-0
.3
49
**
*
-0
.3
40
**
*
0.
19
2*
**
0.
19
2*
**
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
56
)
D
IS
A
G
R
E
E
M
E
N
T
-0
.7
71
0.
71
6*
*
0.
06
0
0.
59
3*
-0
.3
71
**
0.
00
5
(0
.4
72
)
(0
.3
19
)
(0
.2
00
)
(0
.3
03
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.1
19
)
SK
E
W
_p
as
t_
30
0.
10
7*
*
0.
07
3
0.
11
6*
*
0.
10
8*
**
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
42
)
D
U
V
O
L
_p
as
t_
30
0.
13
5*
**
0.
10
6
0.
14
1*
**
0.
13
5*
**
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
42
)
R
et
ur
n_
30
0.
41
4
-0
.7
72
0.
43
2
0.
38
8
-0
.0
93
0.
61
4
0.
01
7
-0
.0
95
(0
.7
46
)
(1
.1
26
)
(1
.2
17
)
(0
.7
51
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.7
19
)
(0
.6
94
)
(0
.4
44
)
R
et
ur
n_
60
0.
78
3
0.
12
5
0.
55
3
0.
78
1
-0
.3
64
0.
25
1
-0
.2
95
-0
.3
64
(0
.5
42
)
(0
.8
09
)
(0
.7
83
)
(0
.5
42
)
(0
.3
21
)
(0
.5
17
)
(0
.4
50
)
(0
.3
22
)
R
et
ur
n_
90
-0
.1
52
-0
.5
00
-0
.2
39
-0
.1
53
0.
13
7
0.
41
9
0.
20
3
0.
13
7
(0
.4
90
)
(0
.6
73
)
(0
.7
01
)
(0
.4
91
)
(0
.2
91
)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.4
03
)
(0
.2
91
)
SD
_p
as
t_
30
1.
49
1
-7
.2
51
13
.3
21
1.
54
2
-2
.0
14
4.
95
5
-1
2.
36
1*
-2
.0
11
(5
.4
43
)
(6
.9
35
)
(1
1.
47
5)
(5
.4
50
)
(3
.2
24
)
(4
.4
29
)
(6
.5
69
)
(3
.2
28
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
04
1
0.
87
0*
*
-0
.7
86
**
*
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
25
-0
.6
44
**
0.
43
5*
**
-0
.0
29
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.2
76
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.2
81
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
10
)
A
dj
us
te
d
R
2
0.
06
0.
03
0.
03
0.
06
0.
07
0.
05
0.
04
0.
07
N
63
0
21
1
41
9
63
0
63
0
21
1
41
9
63
0
36
SENTIMENT, CONVERGENCE OF OPINION, AND MARKET CRASH
since the refined measure needs to calculate the excess return over daily federal fund
rate, which has only been available since 1952. Still, when ignoring the federal fund
rate in the calculation of excess returns, I find that the results for DJIA 1900-1951 are
qualitatively similar to those for DJIA 1952-2008.
An inspection of Table 1.11 indicates that, for the sample of DJIA 1952-2008, the role
of investor sentiment is unaffected by applying the refined investor sentiment indicator
(SENTIMENT_W). Its coefficient is significant at 1% level for all the specifications for
whenever it is included in the regression. Refined measure of differences of opinion
(DISAGREEMENT_W) predicts in the same direction as in Table 1.7, although in the
pessimistic state the coefficient is not significant. Note that in untabulated regressions
at 90 days forecasting horizon, DISAGREEMENT_W regains its statistical significance
at the 1% level in the pessimistic state. For the sample of the S&P 500 between 1964
and 2008, the refined sentiment indicator has again a strong predictive power. The
refined measure of differences of opinion has significant predictive power for both
pessimistic and optimistic states. Taking these results together, I conclude that the
regression results with refined measures of sentiment and disagreement support the
major findings of this paper.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that both investor sentiment and differences
of opinion have a robust forecasting power for aggregate market skewness. High
sentiment forecasts market crash. The role of differences of opinion depends on the
status of investor sentiment. When trend-chasing investors are on average optimistic,
differences of opinion negatively forecast the market skewness; when they are on
average pessimistic, differences of opinion positively forecast the market skewness.
I provide an explanation for the role of differences of opinion by augmenting the theory
of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) with heterogeneous beliefs among trend-chasing
investors. I argue that convergence of opinion in an optimistic state indicates that the
37
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price run-up is unlikely to be sustained since fewer investors can remain net buyers
in the future. Therefore rational arbitrageurs coordinate their attack on the bubble,
leading to a market crash. Vice versa, the convergence of opinion in a pessimistic
state promotes coordinated purchases among rational arbitrageurs, leading to a strong
recovery. Admittedly, the explanation is tentative and informal. Therefore, it calls for a
rigorous model to incorporate the states of investor sentiment into the differences of
opinion framework.
The novel way of constructing trend-chasing investor sentiment and differences of
opinion can be applied to various asset markets, as long as trend-chasing behavior
is prevalent. It has the potential to greatly expand the availability of sentiment
indicators and measures of differences of opinion to a much longer history and to
countries where data on other sentiment indicators are limited. Thus, an immediate
extension of this paper would be to examine whether our results hold for other asset
markets, such as stock markets of other countries or foreign exchange markets. Another
interesting extension would be to study how the trend-chasing investor sentiment and
disagreement help explain the cross-sectional variation in individual stocks. I leave
these interesting extensions to future research.
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Appendix
Filter Rules (FR)
x: increase in the log return required to generate a "buy" signal
y: decrease in the log return required to generate a "sell" signal
e: the number of the most recent days needed to define a low (high) based on which the
filters are applied to generate a "long" ("short") signal
c: number of days a position is held during which all other signals are ignored
x = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 (6 values)
y = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (5 values)
e = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 (5 values)
c = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values)
Note that y must be less than x, there are 15 (x,y) combinations
Number of rules in FR class = x×c+x×e+x×y+ ((x,y) combinations)) = 24+30+15 = 69
Moving Average Rules (MA)
n: number of days in a moving average
m: number of fast-slow combinations of n
b: fixed band multiplicative value
d: number of days for the time delay filter
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
n = 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 (11 values)
m =
∑n−1
i=1 i = 55
b = 0, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (6 values)
d = 2, 3, 4, 5 (4 values)
c = 5, 10, 25 (3 values)
Number of rules in MA class: = b×(n+m)+d×(n+m)+c×(n+m) = 396+264+198 = 858
Support and Resistance (SR, or Trading Range Break) Rules
n: number of days in the support and resistance range;
e: used for an alternative definition of extrema where a low (high) can be defined as the
most recent closing price that is less (greater) than the n previous closing prices;
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b: fixed band multiplicative value;
d: number of days for the time delay filter;
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100 (7 values);
e = 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 25, 50 (7 values);
b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (5 values);
d = 2, 3, 4, 5 (4 values);
c = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values);
Number of rules in SR class = c×(n+e)+b×(n+e)×c+d×c×(n+e) = 100+800+320 =
1220
Channel Breakout Rules (CBO)
n: number of days for a channel
x: difference between the high price and the low price (x×low price) required to form a
channel
b: fixed band multiplicative value (b < x)
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 200 (8 values)
x = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 (5 values)
b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (5 values)
c = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values)
Note that b must be less than x. There are 15 (x,b) combinations.
Number of rules in CBO class = n×x× c+n× c×((x,b) combinations)= 160 + 480 = 640
Total number of trading rules = 2127
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CHAPTER 2
HOW ILLUSORY IS THE PROFITABILITY OF
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS ?∗
ABSTRACT
This paper quantifies the extent of data snooping bias in the commonly used technical
trading strategies. Studying 25988 trading strategies for emerging foreign exchange
markets, we find that the best rules can sometimes generate an annually mean excess
return of more than 30%. Applying standard tests, we find hundreds to thousands of
seemingly significant profitable strategies. Almost all these profits vanish once the data
snooping bias is taken into account. We also show that out-of-sample tests, which are
often proposed as an effective way of reducing the bias, can have a severe data mining
bias. Overall, we show that the profitability of technical analysis is illusory.
∗This chapter is based on a joint paper with Pei Kuang (Goethe University Frankfurt) and Michael
Schröder (Centre for European Economic Research).
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2.1 Introduction
After decades of debate, the profitability of technical trading rules (hereafter "TTR") re-
mains a conundrum. On the one hand, technical analysis only needs public information
such as asset prices. If the market is (weakly) efficient, as widely believed among finan-
cial economists, rational investors should quickly arbitrage away the profits, implying
that technical analysis is useless. On the other hand, if TTR cannot generate persistent
profits, why do at least 90% percent of experienced traders place some weight on it in
costly trading activity [Taylor and Allen (1992)]?
In this paper, we show that the profitability of technical analysis is illusory. Studying
25988 trading strategies for emerging foreign exchange markets, we find that best rules
can sometimes generate an annually mean excess return of more than 30%. Applying
standard tests, we find hundreds to thousands of seemingly significant profitable
strategies. Almost all these profits become insignificant once the data snooping bias is
taken into account. We also show that out-of-sample tests, which are often proposed as
an effective way of reducing the bias, can have a severe data mining bias. We do not
find that certain rules dominate all others, either. It implies that, even if one could find
ex post profitable rules, ex ante the exploitation of these rules is extremely difficult if
not impossible, since we do not know which one to implement.
Economists have long acknowledged the data snooping bias in this context. Indeed, me-
chanical trading rules have ex ante parameters, which are unknown at the beginning of
the trading period. So investors usually need to search intensively among a potentially
large universe of trading rules on a single historical data to find the desired trading
rules. Trying hard and long enough makes it very likely to find seemingly profitable but
in fact wholly spurious trading strategies. The classical statistical inference typically
conducted in the previous literature is biased in this case.
Still, how much can the data snooping bias explain the identified profitability? This
question carries obvious importance for both investors and researchers. Due to its
statistical difficulty, however, few existing research is able to answer this question. Our
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paper quantify the extent of data snooping bias by applying two recently developed
and more powerful methods: the StepM test [Romano and Wolf (2005)] and the SSPA
test [Hsu and Hsu (2006)]. For a given universe of trading strategies, these tests are
data-snooping free since they take the entire search process into account, and hence
are able to detect the genuine profitable trading rules from the universe. We compare
the number of profitable rules from these two tests to that from the classical tests,
which do not control for data snooping bias. The comparison can show how many profits
are genuine and how many are spurious. This provides richer information about the
extent of data snooping bias than only knowing whether the best performing rule has
a true predictive ability or not (as in Reality Check [White (2000)] and the SPA test
[Hansen (2005)]). Therefore we are able to make the extent of data snooping bias more
transparent.
From methodological perspective, we empirically show that data snooping bias can
be substantial in out-of-sample tests too. Out-of-sample tests are usually seen as an
effective way of reducing the bias. If the in-sample result is spurious, it is unlikely
to survive in a new and independent sample. We show, however, that out-of-sample
tests can also result in substantial biases in tests such as those for the trading rule
performance. In this context, if in-sample data snooping is not controlled, many
seemingly satisfactory results emerge. When a single new data is available for out-
of-sample test, it is repeatedly used by one or more researchers and practitioners
for checking whether some or all of those seemingly satisfactory results still hold.
Therefore it is not free of data snooping bias.
Our study provides a comprehensive test of trading rule profitability across 25,988
trading rules. It consists of the simple rules (e.g., filter rules), the charting rules
with kernel smoothing (e.g., Head and Shoulders, as studied by Lo, Mamaysky, and
Wang (2000)), and complex trading rules. The majority of these rules are popular
among professional traders, but have not been studied in the literature for emerging FX
markets. Hence, our paper depicts a more complete picture regarding the performance
of trading rules and market efficiency for these markets.
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Although we consider a large universe of trading rules, we do not assume that any
particular individual has searched across them. Rather, researchers and investors
as a whole are likely to have done this. In fact, before investor communities start to
speculate on an emerging FX market, they have no prior information on which trading
rule will work, hence it appears natural for them to search among the trading rules
known from other markets such as developed countries’ FX markets. Given today’s
high computer capacity and the fact that those trading rules have been implemented
for other markets, we feel it is realistic to assume investors have collectively and
sequentially searched over a large universe of trading rules. Testing such a large
universe has both pros and cons. On the one hand it depicts a much more complete
picture of the trading rule profitability and market efficiency in emerging FX markets
than the existing literature. On the other hand, it raises a concern about the power of
tests. However, we show that our major conclusions continue to hold when testing with
smaller universes.
A study of TTR profitability for emerging FX market is interesting in its own right.
Factors such as spot exchange rate movements, interest rate differentials and trans-
action costs in emerging markets can contribute to TTR profitability differently from
their developed FX market counterparts. For example, spot exchange rates in emerging
market are usually more volatile, and are more likely to undergo a currency crisis. If
the TTR captures the risk premium of a spot rate movement, it is likely to be more
profitable than a developed market, ceteris paribus. On average, the emerging countries
also have higher nominal interest rates, which directly affects the profitability of TTR.
Furthermore, the bid-ask spreads are usually two to four times larger in emerging
markets than in developed countries [Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007)], indi-
cating higher transaction costs. In addition, emerging markets have stricter regulation
and capital control, which makes it more difficult for speculation to arbitrage away the
profits.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a short
literature review. Section 2.3 presents the universe of the trading rules. Section 2.4
discusses the methodology for accounting for the effect of data snooping bias and for
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identifying the profitable strategies. Section 2.5 briefly documents our data and then
reports our main empirical findings. Section 2.6 concludes. A detailed documentation
of the trading rules considered can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
The FX market has substantial supportive evidence for the profitability of technical
analysis. Examples are Sweeney (1986), Levich and Thomas (1993), Neely (1997),
Chang and Osler (1999), LeBaron (1999), Osler (2000), and Qi and Wu (2006). There
are also several studies showing the opposite [see Lee and Mathur (1996), and Neely and
Weller (2003)]. Most of these studies, however, confined themselves to the currencies of
developed economies. It is unclear whether their findings can be carried over to the
emerging markets, which themselves are heterogeneous.
Among the few studies on the profitability of TTR for emerging FX markets, Martin
(2001) investigates moving average rules using daily data between 1993 and 1995 for
12 emerging markets, and finds significant improvement in the mean excess return,
but not in the Sharpe ratio; Lee, Gleason, and Mathur (2001) examine the profitability
of moving average and channel rules in 13 Latin American countries over the period
1992-99 and find mixed results; Pojarliev (2005) documents profitability of moving
average rule using monthly data for the period of 1999-2004. However, it would still
be premature to conclude whether TTR can generate sizable profits based on these
mixed results. Furthermore, these studies do not formally control for the effect of data
snooping bias, which is a critical concern in this line of research. A notable exception is
Qi and Wu (2006). They are the first to study the TTR profitability with formal data
snooping check for developed countries’ currencies. They consider a universe of 2,127
simple technical trading rules and find that data snooping biases do not change the
conclusion of profitability of trading rules in full sample. But in the second half of the
sample the data snooping bias is more serious.
Data snooping has long been considered by academic researchers [Jensen (1967),
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Jensen and Bennington (1970), Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Brock, Lakonishok, and
LeBaron (1992)]. However, a rigorously founded and generally applicable test remained
unavailable until White (2000) introduced the Reality Check. The Reality Check can
directly quantify the effects of data snooping when testing the best trading rule from
the "full universe" of trading strategies. Since then, a couple of studies [e.g., Sullivan,
Timmermann, and White (1999), White (2000), Hsu and Kuan (2005) and Qi and Wu
(2006)] have applied the Reality Check and found mixed results.
Hansen (2005) points out that the power of the Reality Check can be reduced and
even be driven to zero when too many poor and irrelevant rules are included in the
set of alternatives. Simply excluding poor performing alternatives does not lead to
valid inference in general either. To solve this problem, Hansen (2005) proposes a new
test statistic for superior predictive ability (hereafter "SPA"), which invokes a sample-
dependent distribution under the null hypothesis. This SPA test is more powerful
compared to White’s Reality Check and less sensitive to the inclusion of poor and
irrelevant alternatives.
The question of interest for both the Reality Check and the SPA test is whether the best
trading rule beats the benchmark. An investor might want to know whether a particular
trading rule is profitable. A researcher may want to test whether a certain trading
rule found profitable in the literature indeed outperforms the market. Furthermore, as
pointed out by Timmermann (2006), choosing the forecast with the best track record is
often a bad idea, and a combination of forecasts dominates the best individual forecast
in out-of-sample forecasting experiments. So we may want to know all or some of
the profitable trading strategies and combine them for decision making (this is what
our complex trading rules do).1 We may also want to avoid worse strategies when
combining trading rules, since trimming them off often helps to improve forecasting
performance as found in the forecasting literature [Timmermann (2006)]. Romano and
Wolf (2005) modify the Reality Check and propose a stepwise multiple test (hereafter
"StepM"), which can detect as many profitable trading rules as possible for a given
1Some evidence of unstable performance of the trading strategy is provided in Sullivan, Timmermann,
and White (1999). They find that the best trading rule applying to DJIA for the period of 1897-1986 does
not outperform the benchmark for the period of 1987-1996.
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significance level. Hsu and Hsu (2006) propose a stepwise SPA (hereafter "SSPA") test
to combine the SPA test and the StepM test, which is more powerful in identifying all
good trading strategies than those two. These two stepwise tests enable us to separate
the genuine profitable rules from spurious ones among all seemingly profitable rules
obtained from classical tests, and hence provide a more complete picture of the extent
of data snooping bias.
When the new data is available, some researchers [for example, Neely, Weller, and
Ulrich (forthcoming)] conduct out-of-sample tests to check whether previously identified
profitable trading rules still are still profitable in the new data, as a way to control for
data snooping bias. This is generally regarded as an effective way. In the large scale
tests, however, the out-of-sample data snooping bias can also occur.2 In this paper we
also investigate this potential bias.
2.3 Universe of Trading Rules
Defining the universe of trading rules is a key step for obtaining valid inference in a
superior predictive ability test. On the one hand, having a too small universe may miss
the data snooping bias incurred during the search for profitable trading rules. On the
other hand, the power of test may be reduced when too many irrelevant trading rules
are included. Furthermore, defining a complete and exhaustive universe of trading
rules is neither possible nor viable. In balancing these considerations, we expand the
trading rules to a large universe while keeping it computationally feasible. In total
we have 25,988 trading rules, consisting of simple rules, charting rules with kernel
smoothing and complex trading rules. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the universe
of trading rules we considered. Since the class of simple trading rules has well been
described in the literature, we leave its details to the appendix. In the following, we
focus on describing the other two group of trading. The parameters used in these
trading strategies are reported in the appendix.
2Inoue and Kilian (2004) point out that out-of-sample tests can have as serious data mining bias as
in-sample test.
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Table 2.1: The Universe of Trading Rules
Trading Rules Number of rules
Simple trading rules
Filter Rules (FR) 497
Moving Averages (MA) 2049
Support and Resistance (SR) 1220
Channel Break-Outs (CB) 2040
Momentum Strategies in Price (MSP) 1040
Chart rules with kernel smoothing
Head and Shoulders (HS, IHS) 3384
Triangle (TA) 1128
Rectangle (RA) 3384
Double Tops and Bottoms (DTB) 3384
Broadening Tops and Bottoms (BTB) 1128
Complex trading rules
Learning Strategies (LS) 1872
Voting Strategies (VS) 26
Fraction Position Strategies (FPS) 26
Voting by Learning Strategies (VLS) 4810
Total number of trading rules 25988
Charting Rules with Kernel Smoothing
Similarly to Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000), we consider 5 pairs of technical patterns,
applying each to kernel smoothed spot series. These strategies include Head and
Shoulders (HS) and Inverse Head and Shoulders (IHS), Triangle (TA), Rectangle (RA),
Double Tops and Bottoms (DTB) and Broadening Tops and Bottoms (BTB).
Using non-parametric smoothing does not mean that the rules we are considering are
too complicated for investors to use. On the contrary, we do this because investors
filter out noise when using these nonlinear rules. In this sense, they are carrying out
smoothing in their trading practice. Kernel smoothing is an ideal way to smooth the
spot rates. The critical issue in kernel smoothing is the choice of bandwidth. The aim
here is to find which degree of smoothing can mimic the eyeball smoothing adopted by
investors. Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000) recommend a bandwidth of 0.3×(optimal
band width). The optimal band width is calculated from a cross validation method
[Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000)].3 Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000) advocate the
3For a detailed discussion on kernel smoothing and cross validation, see Härdle (1990).
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use of this under-smoothed stock price series since they are neither too volatile nor
too smooth, and the professional technical analysts they interviewed feel that such
a smoothing is more acceptable than other versions of smoothed series. They admit,
however, that such an approach is ad hoc. Commenting on that paper, Jegadeesh (2000)
recommends the use of different choices of bandwidth to assess whether their results
are sensitive to these choices. Gene Savin and Zvingelis (2007) consider the multiples
1, 1.5, 2 and 2.5 of the optimal bandwidth. We use three different bandwidths (scaling
the optimal bandwidth with 0.3, 1 and 4), as well as the original series, in order to see
the effect from under-smoothing, optimal smoothing, over-smoothing and no smoothing.
Therefore, each pair of charting rules in this class is applied to four versions of spot
rates, depending on the smoothing parameters used.
Head and Shoulders and Inverted Head and Shoulders
Head and Shoulders is one of the most popular and trusted chart patterns by practi-
tioners in technical analysis. It occurs when the second (head) of three consecutive
peaks exceeds the first (left shoulder) and the third (right shoulder). The minima
between left (right) shoulder and the head are called left (right) troughs. We require
the two shoulders (troughs) to be approximately equal such that their differences are
no more than a differential rate x. The HS pattern is completed when the adjacent local
minimum of the right shoulder penetrates the neckline and the band. Short position
in foreign currency is taken exactly on the day when the price crosses the neckline
and the band. Following Chang and Osler (1999), two exit rules for HS strategy are
considered, namely endogenous and exogenous. For the endogenous one, we distinguish
two kinds of situations. We define a cutoff as y times the standard deviation of the
daily exchange rate change. If the price falls by d percent times difference between
head and average trough(the difference is referred to as "measuring objective" or "price
objective" in technical manual), we exit on the day when the price has risen above a
local minimum by the cutoff percentage, which implies that the price has conclusively
stopped moving in the predicted direction. In the second case, if the price does not
fall by such an amount, we allow for a possible bounce or interruption, that is, the
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price may temporarily move back toward the neckline. When the second trough falls
below the aforementioned d percent line, we are back to the former case. Otherwise,
we liquidate the position at the second trough. In both situations, in order to limit
the loss, a stop-loss line is incorporated whenever the price goes sufficiently far in the
wrong direction. An exogenous exit rule means we close our position after holding for
an exogenous specified number of days f. As the name tellingly reveals, the inverted
Head and Shoulders is simply an inverse version of Head and Shoulders; once the IHS
is completed, the speculator expects an upward trend in the future spot exchange rate.
As a result he or she will borrow the British Pound to buy the foreign currency.
Triangle
Triangle is one of the reverse patterns which is also based on pricing movements
showing five consecutive local extrema. Triangle tops (TTOP) are characterized by
three descending local maxima and two ascending local minima. Triangle bottoms
(TBOP) are characterized by three ascending local minima and two descending local
maxima. Once a triangle is completed, it will constitute a signal for taking a long
(short) position in foreign currency if the future closing spot exchange rate exceeds the
latest top (or falls below the latest bottom) by a fixed proportion x, known as the "trend
filter". We consider similar liquidation methods as for HS.
Rectangle
The rectangle pattern is also characterized by five consecutive local extrema. Rectangle
tops (RTOP) require three tops and two bottoms to lie near an upper horizontal lines,
that is, within x percent of their average, respectively. Moreover, we require the lowest
top to be higher than the highest bottom. Similarly, the rectangle bottoms (RBOT)
require two tops and three bottoms lie near the upper horizontal lines. Signals are
generated in a similar way as the Triangle rule, so are the liquidation methods.
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Double Tops and Bottoms
The double tops (bottoms) are characterized by two tops (bottoms) that lie near an
upper horizontal lines, with one bottom (top) lies in between. Following Lo, Mamaysky,
and Wang (2000), we require the two tops (bottoms) to occur at least a month, or with
22 intermediatory trading days. In addition, the second top (bottom) should be higher
(lower) than all the local maxima (minima) in between.
Broadening Tops and Bottoms
Similarly to the Triangle class, the Broadening Tops and Bottoms are characterized by
five consecutive local extrema. Broadening Tops (BTOP) requires 3 descending local
maxima and two ascending local minima. Broadening Bottoms requires 3 descending lo-
cal minima and two ascending local maxima. Compared to the Triangle class, this class
presupposes a "divergence" shape, while the Triangle class requires a "convergence"
shape.
Complex Trading Rules
Single rules can generate false signals when prices fluctuate in a broad sideways
pattern. Relying on a single rule can be a dangerous practice, even for the historical
best rule. Technical analysts can combine other trading rules to confirm the prediction
of price direction. Following Hsu and Kuan (2005), we consider three classes of complex
trading rules: the learning strategy (LS), the voting strategy (VS), and the fractional
position strategy (FPS). Besides these complex trading rules, we also propose a new
class of complex rules, namely the voting by learning strategy (VLS), which combines
the voting and learning rules.
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Learning Strategy (LS)
A learning strategy assumes that after an investor learns about the strategies’ perfor-
mances from the past m days (memory span) within the certain class, he can switch his
position by following the best strategy found during the memory span. After his switch,
he waits for r days (review span) and then reevaluates the strategies’ performances of
the past m days (memory span) to decide whether to switch. For the evaluation of the
trading rules, we use the mean return and the Sharpe ratio during the memory span
as the performance measure.
Voting Strategy (VS)
Voting strategy is a system of voting by trading rules within each class. Each rule
is assigned one vote for recommending a ballot. We consider the three choice ballot,
where either a long, a short or no position can be voted. The decision follows the
recommendation of majority votes. To avoid the voting result being dominated by
a class with a large number of rules, we consider every class of non-complex rules
separately but not the one consisting of all rules.
Fractional Position Strategy (FPS)
Note that both the learning strategy and the voting strategy yield the signal as an
integer. The fractional position strategy, in contrast, allows to take the position of a non-
integer between −1 and 1. The fraction of a position is determined by an "evaluation
index". In our case, it is only the fraction of winning votes that recommend the same
positions relative to all votes within the same class.
Voting by Learning Strategy(VLS)
To implement this strategy, we consider the best n trading rules evaluated from the
memory span within each class of non-complex rules, and then assign votes to these
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rules as in the voting strategy class. The decision follows the recommendation of
majority votes from the best n trading rules. In addition, we consider the case in which
the top n trading rules are selected from the set of all non-complex trading rules.
2.4 Methodology
In this section, we discuss the empirical tests used in this paper. The discussion is kept
informal and heuristic, with more technical description provided in Appendix C.
2.4.1 Performance Measures
Suppose that our universe of trading rules includes m rules. Let δkt−1 be a "signal"
function which generates a trading signal by the kth trading rule using information
up to t − 1. This signal function can assume three values that instructs a trader to
take a short position (δkt−1 = −1), a long position (δkt−1 = 1), or no position (δkt−1 = 0) in a
foreign currency at time t− 1. The kth trading rule yields the profit as:
Rkt = (st − st−1 + r∗t − rt)δkt−1 − abs(δkt−1 − δkt−2)g (2.1)
where Rkt is the excess return from trading on the currency in period t using kth trading
rule, st is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate (British Pound price of one unit
foreign currency) at time t; rt and r∗t are domestic and foreign interest rates from time
t-1 to t, respectively; g is a one way transaction cost.
We consider two performance measures: the mean excess return and the the Sharpe
ratio.4 We use a natural benchmark that the investor does not take position in the
foreign exchange market and hence earns a zero excess return (alternatively, zero
Sharpe ratio). Therefore our performance measure is in fact a relative performance
4The Sharpe ratio used here is in fact so called information ratio, defined as the mean excess return
divided by the standard deviation. In practice, people do not make a strict distinction between these
two measures. So we still use the name "Sharpe ratio" here. We calculate the robust Sharpe ratio with
studentization and HAC standard errors. See Wolf (2007) for details.
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measure [dk,t in the notation of Hansen (2005)] of kth trading strategy compared to the
benchmark.
2.4.2 Empirical Tests
Reality Check
White (2000) tests the null hypothesis that the benchmark is not inferior to any of the
alternative trading rules. Suppose we search in 1000 trading rules to test whether the
best trading rule from these 1000 trading rules is significantly better than a benchmark.
Instead of comparing one trading rule to the benchmark as in the classical test, we look
at a vector of 1000 relative performance measure at the same time. Each element in
the vector represents the relative performance of one model in the universe. Testing
whether the best rule is profitable is equivalent to ask whether the maximal value
in this vector is significantly larger than zero. The distribution of the maximum in a
vector of elements differs from the distribution of the element in the vector. The latter
is used for inference in classical tests. Doing this gives consideration to the full set of
models underlying the vector that led to the best performing trading rule. Rejecting
the null hypothesis implies that at least one trading rule beats the benchmark.
Due to the complication of the true distribution of the test, White (2000) recommends the
stationary bootstrap method of Politis and Romano (1994) to first obtain the empirical
distribution of the test statistic, and obtain the p-value by comparing it with the
quantiles of the empirical distribution from bootstrap re-sampling. If the p-value is
smaller than a given significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected.
SPA test
The null hypothesis of SPA test [Hansen (2005)] is the same as in White’s Reality
Check. Unlike the White’s Reality Check, the SPA test uses the studentized test
statistic, which will typically improve the power. Hansen (2005) provides a concrete
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example for highlighting the advantage of studentizing the individual statistics, since
it avoids a comparison of the performance measured in different "units of standard
deviation". Furthermore, the SPA test invokes a sample-dependent distribution under
the null hypothesis, which can discard the poor models asymptotically. Therefore, the
new test is more powerful and less sensitive to the inclusion of poor and irrelevant
alternatives. The improvement of the power of the SPA test over the Reality Check
is further confirmed by the simulation experiment conducted in Hansen (2005). The
p-value of SPA test is calculated by bootstrapping its empirical distribution.
StepM test
Both the Reality Check and the SPA test seek to answer whether the best trading
strategy beats the benchmark. As discussed in section 3.1, it is often more interesting
to identify all outperforming trading rules, or to know whether a particular trading rule
improves upon the benchmark. The Reality Check can be modified easily for identifying
potential strategies that beat the benchmark, but Romano and Wolf (2005) show that
this is only suboptimal, and only amounts to the first step of StepM test of Romano
and Wolf (2005), which can detect more good strategies from the second step on. The
StepM test is therefore more powerful than the Reality Check in detecting superior
trading rules. The aim of the StepM test is to find as many profitable trading rules as
possible. They test whether the individual trading rule is better than the benchmark
by checking whether it falls into a joint confidence region constructed from all trading
strategies. If not, that trading strategy is detected as profitable. When some trading
strategies are detected, the remaining trading strategies can be used to construct a
new joint confidence region. Then the first step is repeated to find whether there are
remaining profitable trading strategies. One continues this way until no profitable
rules can be detected.
Romano and Wolf (2005) also propose the use of studentization to improve the power
and level properties of the StepM test.
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Stepwise SPA test
The Stepwise SPA test of Hsu and Hsu (2006) aims at combining the advantages of both
the SPA test and the StepM test, to improve upon the White’s Reality Check in two
different ways. In this setting, the null hypothesis is similar to the StepM test, though
it invokes a sample-dependent distribution under the null hypothesis, such that poor
and irrelevant trading rules will be discarded asymptotically. They provide a formal
proof and simulation results to demonstrate that the SSPA test is more powerful than
the Reality Check, SPA test, and StepM test.
2.5 Empirical Results
Data and Summary Statistics
We collect daily spot exchange rate data from Datastream, which covers the period
from January 1994 to July 2007. The spot exchange rate is quoted as foreign currency
units per British pound (hereafter GBP). We study the countries which have both a spot
exchange rate and an overnight interest rate available (if no overnight interest rate is
available, we use other daily short rate instead). In total, we include ten currencies
from emerging markets, which represent various geographic regions. The data for most
of them starts in the 1990s. All considered currencies and their data availability are
reported in table 2.2.
Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics of daily returns (defined as the log difference
of spot exchange rates). The mean return shows the average depreciation of individual
emerging market currency against the GBP in the sample period. Almost all the
emerging market currencies on average depreciate relatively to the GBP, with only one
currency [Czech Republic (Koruny)] that appreciates. The highest daily depreciation
happens to the Mexican Peso, with an amount of 11.4 percent. The highest appreciation
happens to the Mexican Peso, too (15.56 percent). The standard deviations are usually
higher than those commonly found in the exchange rates of developed countries [see
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Table 2.2: Data Used for Testing the Profitability of Trading Rules
All data are from Datastream.
Currency Symbol Available data Out-of-Sample test period
Brazil, Reais BRL 01/2000-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Czech Republic, Koruny CZK 01/1998-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Hungary, Forint HUF 09/1995-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
India, Rupees INR 01/1994-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Indonesia, Rupiahs IDR 01/1999-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Mexico, Pesos MXN 01/1995-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Poland, Zlotych PLN 01/1995-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
South Africa, Rand ZAR 01/1996-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Thailand, Baht THB 01/1999-07/2007 08/2002-07/2007
Turkey, New Lira TRY 08/2002-07/2007 n.a.
Qi and Wu (2006) for comparison]. The skewness is relatively small for all currencies.
The large kurtosis found in most of these currencies shows that extreme deprecia-
tion/appreciation occurred. Lee, Gleason, and Mathur (2001) also report extremely high
kurtosis, consistent with our findings. Overall the summary statistics illustrate more
volatile exchange rates with the emerging market than with their developed countries’
counterparts.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Daily Changes in the Logarithm of Exchange Rates
This table reports the daily returns, defined as the log difference of spot exchange rates
Currency Observation Mean (%) Std (%) Min (%) MAX (%) Skewness Kurtosis
BRL 1975 0.0119 1.09 -10.87 9.08 -0.11 13.57
CZK 2498 -0.0127 0.55 -2.49 2.66 -0.01 4.52
HUF 3107 0.0198 0.54 -2.42 4.89 0.36 6.92
INR 3541 0.0161 0.52 -2.29 3.99 0.23 5.49
IDR 2237 0.0156 1.05 -8.70 7.96 -0.20 12.62
MXN 3281 0.0323 1.02 -15.56 11.39 -0.49 45.37
PLN 3281 0.0119 0.60 -3.02 4.19 0.42 6.70
THB 2237 0.0057 0.62 -7.50 8.92 0.59 32.76
TRY 1303 0.0002 0.88 -5.61 6.34 0.64 8.67
ZAR 3021 0.0310 0.93 -9.10 7.02 0.14 9.92
2.5.1 Full Sample Results
In this section we report the performance of trading rules using the full sample, with
the whole universe of (25,988) trading rules, and with or without taking the transaction
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cost into account. We first present the data snooping bias in the best performing rules,
as those reported in the literature. We then report the bias in all seemingly profitable
rules.
Biases in the most profitable trading rules
We first assume no transaction costs. Table 2.4 shows the performance of the best
trading rules (in terms of best past performance) under both the mean excess return
(panel A) and Sharpe Ratio (panel B) criteria for each currency. According to the mean
excess return, the best trading rule of each currency yields all positive but highly
heterogeneous mean excess returns across currencies, ranging from a low of 6% (Thai
Baht) to a high of 32% (Brazilian Real).
Interestingly, four out of ten best trading rules reported are charting rules, which are
all based on an under-smoothed version of spot rate series.5 These spot rates are first
smoothed using the kernel smoothing method, and then the charting rules are applied
to obtain the trading signals. The two best trading rules are from the class of Head and
Shoulders and the other two are from Rectangle Rules. Filter rules are found to be the
most profitable for all three currencies.
Panel A also reports four p-values (one p-value from the Reality Check and three
p-values from the SPA test, including the upper bound and lower bound p-values).6 We
also calculate the nominal p-value by applying the Reality Check to each trading rule.
Since the nominal p-value does not account for the search among all the trading rules,
it is subject to data snooping bias. We find the smallest nominal p-values very close to
zero for every currency, we do not enlist it in the table. Note that the best performing
rule from the original sample is not necessarily the best performing rule from bootstrap
5In the table, the number following directly after the abbreviation of the charting rules with the kernel
smoothing indicates the degree of smoothing. “1” stands for smoothing with 0.3 multiple of optimal
bandwidth. Similarly, “2” and “3” stand for 1 and 4 multiple of optimal bandwidth, respectively. “4”
stands for no smoothing.
6To calculate the p-values, we apply circular block bootstrap with a block length of 2 and 500 bootstrap
replications. Our results hardly change when we use a different block length or other bootstrap procedures
such as the stationary bootstrap or the moving block bootstrap.
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samples, which has the smallest nominal p-value calculated. Its past performance
may simply stem from pure luck. The reported four p-values can be compared to the
smallest nominal p-value, which is an easy but rigorous way of quantifying the effect
of data-snooping bias. Not surprisingly, all the p-values with data snooping check are
bigger than the smallest nominal p-values, which ignore the data snooping bias. Two
out of ten currencies (Hungarian Forint and Mexican Peso) have a p value (SPAc) which
is less than 0.05, indicating that at least one trading rule is found to be significantly
profitable (at 5% significance level) if one ignores transaction costs. For the remaining
eight currencies, no trading rules are found to be profitable even in the absence of
transaction costs.
The Sharpe ratios of the best rules reported in panel B are all positive and large in
the absence of transaction costs, ranging from 0.95 to 1.81. Five out of ten currencies
are detected to have profitable rules. The majority of the best performing rules (six
out of ten) are charting rules with kernel smoothing, among which five are Head and
Shoulders rules and one is the Rectangle rule. Two complex rules are also among the
best performing rules, both of which are voting by learning rules based on the Rectangle
rules class. Still, the smallest nominal p-value for every currency is close to zero. When
comparing them to the p-values of the Reality Check and the SPA test, they are much
smaller in most cases, indicating that the data snooping bias is large. Although the
results so far show that some currencies have at least one profitable trading rule in the
absence of transaction costs, it is still premature to conclude that there are profitable
rules in practice where non-zero transaction costs are involved.
Transaction costs are an important concern when testing TTR profitability. Lee, Glea-
son, and Mathur (2001) uses one-way transaction costs of 0.1% for Latin American
Countries’ currencies. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007) mention that the
emerging countries’ bid-ask spreads are usually 2-4 times higher than the developed
counties’ currencies. Qi and Wu (2006) use transaction costs of 0.04% for developed FX
markets. So we choose 0.1% as one-way transaction costs. We have also considered
a higher transaction cost of 0.3% and a lower one of 0.04%. We report results with a
one-way transaction cost of 0.1%. Results with other transaction costs are qualitatively
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similar.
Table 2.5 documents the performance of the best trading rules according to both the
mean excess return (panel A) and Sharpe ratio (panel B).
Not surprisingly, both the mean excess returns and the Sharpe ratio are smaller than
those in the previous case. They are still positive and large for all currencies, however.
The annual mean excess return ranges from 0.05 (Thai Baht) to 0.30 (Brazilian Real).
The annualized Sharpe ratio lie between 0.78 (Indian Rupee) and 1.72 (Brazilian Real).
The number of transactions is also smaller. For the mean excess return criteria, seven
of the best rules are simple rules, two are charting rules with under-smoothing and one
is a learning rule based on the filter rule class. Under the Sharpe ratio criteria, four
of the best performing rules are Head and Shoulders applied to under-smoothed spot
rates, and two are learning rule and voting by learning rule. The remaining four are
the momentum rules in price, the filter rule and the support and resistance rule.
A close look at p-values of the Reality Check and the SPA tests shows no profitable rules
according to the mean excess return criteria. The smallest p-value with data-snooping
check is 0.17 (Mexican Peso). For the Sharpe ratio, we find that two out of ten currencies
(Brazilian Real and Mexican Peso) have profitable rules, even after the data-snooping
bias is controlled for7. In general, since we still have the smallest nominal p-value close
to zero for every currency, we will find profitable rules if the data snooping bias is not
considered. Therefore, ignoring the data snooping effect leads to a significant bias.
Bias in all “profitable” trading rules
It is often desirable to know all profitable trading rules, as discussed in the previous
sections. We detect all the profitable rules according to the individual nominal p-value,
the StepM test and the SSPA test. We report the total number of profitable trading
rules detected by the nominal p-value and compare them to those found by the StepM
7In the case of a 0.04% one-way transaction cost, we find no profitable rules according to the mean excess
return criteria, but find three currencies have profitable rules according to the Sharpe ratio criteria.
Assuming a transaction cost of 0.3%, we find no profitable rules under either criteria.
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or the SSPA test. This comparison can serve as a way of summarizing the danger of
data snooping for all profitable rules according to the nominal p-value.
Table 2.6 reports the number of profitable trading rules without transaction costs (panel
A), with one-way transaction costs of 0.04% (Panel B) and with one-way transaction
costs of 0.1% (panel C) under both the mean excess return and the Sharpe ratio criteria.
In the absence of transaction costs, and ignoring data snooping bias (nominal p-value),
we find for almost every currency more than 1,000 profitable trading rules for each
criteria. When the data snooping bias is taken into account, we find that only two out
of ten currencies have profitable rules according to the mean excess return, and five
out of ten according to the Sharpe ratio criteria. These findings are consistent with
the results in table 2.4. Furthermore, the total number of trading rules detected to be
profitable is quite small compared to those found by individual nominal p-values. As to
the mean excess return criteria, the largest number of profitable trading rules found is
41 (Hungarian Forint by the SSPA test) while a test based on nominal p-value finds
1,266 profitable rules. For the Sharpe criteria, the detected number of profitable rules is
at most 134 (Mexican Peso by the SSPA test) and a test based on nominal p-value finds
2,117 profitable rules. The Brazilian Real is found to have the largest number (more
than 3,000) of profitable trading rules under both criteria if ignoring data snooping
bias, though no more than one rule remains significantly profitable according to StepM
and SSPA. This means that for about every 8 trading rules we can find one profitable
rule, but none of them are indeed profitable. These results are striking, highlighting
the enormous danger of data snooping.
When we have one-way transaction costs of 0.04%, we find fewer profitable trading
rules (Panel B). They range from 242 to 3016 according to mean excess return, and
from 468 to 3174 rules according to the Sharpe ratio criteria. StepM and SSPA test
find only three currencies with profitable rules in the case of the Sharpe ratio. Even in
the case of a 0.1% transaction cost, we can still find hundreds or thousands of trading
rules for every currency according to both criteria when we consider the individual
nominal p-value. The StepM test on the contrary, finds no profitable rules. Only under
the Sharpe ratio criteria, does the SSPA test find one profitable rule for the Brazilian
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Real and 24 profitable rules for the Mexican Peso. Again, these striking results indicate
that the data snooping bias is substantial.
All three panels also show that the SSPA test can detect more, but not less profitable
trading rules than the StepM test, confirming that the SSPA test does have higher
power than the StepM test.
2.5.2 Sub-sample Analysis
Trading rule performance is often not stable. Today’s profitable rule does not guarantee
sure profits for tomorrow. For example, Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999)
find that the best trading rule applying to DJIA for the period of 1897-1986 does not
outperform the benchmark for the period of 1987-1996. Qi and Wu (2006) find the
profitability has declined in recent periods. For this reason, we document the trading
rule profitability in two subperiods of our sample. The second subperiod is between
08/2002 and 07/2007 for each currency. Having the same length of second subperiods
facilitates a comparison across currencies. We report the results which assume one-way
transaction costs of 0.1%. The results with transaction costs of 0.04% are qualitatively
similar.
Table 2.7 reports the results for the first subperiod. Most of the best performing rules
(eight out of ten) are found to be simple rules like channel breakout rules, and the
remaining two are Head and Shoulders rules with under smoothing for mean excess
return (panel A). Under the Sharpe ratio criteria (panel B) the best trading rules
disperse over the simple rules, charting rules with kernel smoothing and complex rules.
For both criteria, we find extremely high performance for Brazilian Real (annual mean
excess return of 0.76 and Sharpe ratio of 2.97). We still find thousands of profitable
trading rules according to an individual nominal p-value (results not reported), but we
find no profitable trading rules according to the SPA test.
67
HOW ILLUSORY IS THE PROFITABILITY OF TECHNICAL ANALYSIS?
Table 2.6: Number of Profitable Trading Rules
All profitable trading rules are detected at 5% level. The universe of trading rules contains 25988
rules. The whole sample data are used for detecting the profitable rules.
Panel A: without transaction cost
Mean Excess Return Criteria Sharpe Ratio Criteria
Currency Nominal P-value StepM SSPA Nominal P-value StepM SSPA
BRL 3393 0 0 3556 1 1
CZK 442 0 0 704 0 0
HUF 1266 32 41 1725 103 121
INR 1286 0 0 1844 0 16
IDR 1470 0 0 2370 0 0
MXN 1822 18 22 2117 102 134
PLN 1115 0 0 1263 0 0
TRY 1116 0 0 1554 0 0
THB 944 0 0 2234 0 5
ZAR 1949 0 0 2164 0 0
Panel B: with one-way transaction cost of 0.04%
Mean Excess Return Criteria Sharpe Ratio Criteria
Currency Nominal P-value StepM SSPA Nominal P-value StepM SSPA
BRL 3016 0 0 3174 0 1
CZK 242 0 0 468 0 0
HUF 822 0 0 1134 75 95
INR 574 0 0 917 0 0
IDR 909 0 0 1713 0 0
MXN 1471 0 0 1648 32 113
PLN 578 0 0 606 0 0
TRY 880 0 0 1158 0 0
THB 562 0 0 1812 0 0
ZAR 1545 0 0 1784 0 0
Panel C: with one-way transaction cost of 0.1%
Mean Excess Return Criteria Sharpe Ratio Criteria
Currency Nominal P-value StepM SSPA Nominal P-value StepM SSPA
BRL 2599 0 0 2744 0 1
CZK 117 0 0 192 0 0
HUF 338 0 0 417 0 0
INR 198 0 0 419 0 0
IDR 396 0 0 657 0 0
MXN 1139 0 0 1316 0 24
PLN 323 0 0 358 0 0
TRY 680 0 0 871 0 0
THB 264 0 0 1224 0 0
ZAR 1166 0 0 1361 0 0
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We report the results for the second sample period in table 2.8. Unlike Qi and Wu
(2006), we do not find a uniform decline of mean excess returns and the Sharpe ratio
relative to the first sub-sample. Indeed, we find that two currencies under mean excess
return criteria and four currencies under Sharpe ratio criteria have higher profits than
their first subperiod counterparts. We also find that the performance of the best rule
for Brazilian Real is not that extreme (annual mean excess return of 0.23 and Sharpe
ratio of 1.57). The best performing rules are most frequently found to be simple rules
such as support and resistance and momentum strategy in price, though there are also
charting rules applied to under smoothed spot rates and complex rules. When looking
at the p-values with data snooping check, we again find no profitable rules.
2.5.3 Out-of-sample Data Snooping Bias
An out-of-sample test is an effective way of detecting a data snooping bias. Still, caution
has to be taken, when the same new data is used repeatedly for testing various models
in out-of-sample experiments. In this case, a data snooping bias can still emerge. This
is particularly relevant when the number of models to be tested out-of-sample is really
large. Unfortunately, this potential pitfall has not been well acknowledged in the
literature. In this section we show that the out-of-sample data snooping bias can be
substantial in testing a large number of trading rules.
We conduct the out-of-sample experiment as follows. First, we take the first sub-sample
as the in-sample data, and detect all profitable trading rules according to the nominal
p-value. That is, we ignore the data snooping bias. The detected profitable rules
are then taken as the universe of trading rules for our out-of-sample analysis. The
out-of-sample test uses the second sub-sample and detects all profitable trading rules
using tests with and without a data snooping check.
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Table 2.9 reports the number of trading rules in the out-of-sample tests. “NPSample1”
refers to the number of profitable trading rules found in the first sub-sample when the
data snooping bias is ignored. “NPOOS” stands for the number of profitable trading
rules found in the out-of-sample test without controlling for a data snooping bias. This
implies that all these rules are found to be profitable both in-sample and out-of-sample
according to the nominal p-value. “StepMOOS” and “SSPAOOS” report the number of
profitable rules detected out-of-sample according to the StepM test and the SSPA test,
respectively. The difference between NPOOS and StepMOOS or SSPAOOS provides a
quantification of the extent of the out-of-sample data snooping bias. In panel A we
consider a one-way transaction cost of 0.04%. According to the mean excess criteria,
ignoring the data snooping bias, we find seemingly profitable trading rules for every
country. They range from 3 (Polish Zloty) to 630 (Brazilian Real). 5 out of 10 currencies
have more than 100 profitable rules. The percentage of rules which are profitable both
in sample and out-of-sample differs a lot across currencies. For example, almost 50% of
in-sample profitable rules are also out-of-sample profitable for Czech Koruna, but for
Polish Zloty, this percentage is almost zero. When we control for data snooping bias,
both the out-of-sample StepM test and SPA test find no profitable rules. If we consider
the Sharpe ratio criteria, we find similar substantial out-of-sample data snooping bias,
though in this case the StepM test and SSPA test sometimes identify a few (less than
7) profitable rules out-of-sample. Imposing a higher one-way transaction cost of 0.1%
( panel B ) reduces the number of profitable rules both in-sample and out-of-sample.
Still, the difference between NPOOS and StepMOOS or SSPAOOS shows that ignoring
the data snooping is a danger practice. In the case of the Czech Koruna under mean
excess return criteria, 52 out of 131 in-sample detected profitable rules will be wrongly
discovered as profitable in the absence of a data snooping check. With a one-way cost
as high as 0.1%, there are still 704 trading rules incorrectly detected as profitable for
Brazilian Real under Sharpe ratio criteria. Both the StepM test and SSPA test only
find one rule to be profitable out-of-sample, which is free of data snooping bias. This
indicates that, on average out-of-sample tests do alleviate the data snooping bias to a
large extent, but ignoring the repeating testing in out-of-sample experiments can bias
the results substantially.
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2.5.4 Reduced Universe of Trading Rules
Our universe of trading rules is the largest in number in the FX trading rule literature
so far. This, however, raises the concern about the power of the test, as the number
of trading rules is large and is usually five times higher than the number of the
observations. To address this issue, we consider a reduced universe, which contains
the trading rules in each class.8 The size of these universes ranges from 497 (filter
rule) to 3,384 (Head and Shoulders for example). By doing this, we assume that the
professional traders and researchers only search for profitable rules within each class.
We have also considered a universe which either contains all simple trading rules, or
all charting rules with kernel smoothing.
We report the results for the filter rule and the moving average rule, which are the most
frequently studied classes in the FX trading rules literature. Results based on other
classes of trading rules are similar, and are available from the authors upon request.
Panel A of table 2.10 shows the results for the class of filter rules. Even when assuming
no transaction costs, and in a universe as small as the one of only 497 trading rules,
we detect no profitable trading rules according to the StepM and the SSPA test for all
currencies. Ignoring the data snooping bias involved, however, one can find much more
profitable trading rules based on the nominal p-value. The extent of data snooping
bias is substantial. Similarly, for the moving average rule in panel B, we find some
profitable trading rules according to the nominal p-value. Once the data snooping bias
is controlled for, we find no profitable rules in the moving average class, even when we
assume zero transaction costs. Given the results in these two examples and similar
results for unreported universes, we conclude that our major results, namely that the
data snooping bias is substantial and that evidence supporting the TTR profitability is
rare, are robust to a smaller universe of trading rules.
8We do not consider complex rules here, since they are based on simple rules and charting rules with
kernel smoothing, which search implicitly in large universes.
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Table 2.10: Number of Profitable Trading Rules (Reduced Universe)
All profitable trading rules are detected at the 5% significance level. We assume that there is no
transaction cost involved.
Panel A: Filter Rule class (total number of trading rules: 497 )
Mean Excess Return Criteria Sharpe Ratio Criteria
Currency Nominal P-value StepM SSPA Nominal P-value StepM SSPA
BRL 80 0 0 88 0 0
CZK 6 0 0 8 0 0
HUF 17 0 0 20 0 0
INR 19 0 0 20 0 0
IDR 18 0 0 19 0 0
MXN 6 0 0 6 0 0
PLN 32 0 0 33 0 0
TRY 32 0 0 27 0 0
THB 0 0 0 0 0 0
ZAR 25 0 0 24 0 0
Panel B: Moving Average class (total number of trading rules: 2049 )
Mean Excess Return Criteria Sharpe Ratio Criteria
Currency Nominal P-value StepM SSPA Nominal P-value StepM SSPA
BRL 476 0 0 438 0 0
CZK 4 0 0 3 0 0
HUF 16 0 0 16 0 0
INR 16 0 0 16 0 0
IDR 107 0 0 114 0 0
MXN 13 0 0 16 0 0
PLN 90 0 0 96 0 0
TRY 11 0 0 14 0 0
THB 0 0 0 0 0 0
ZAR 102 0 0 96 0 0
2.6 Conclusion
There is substantial empirical evidence documenting the success of the technical
analysis in various markets, especially in FX markets. Critics, however, cite data
snooping as one major source of this anomaly.
The purpose of this paper is to quantifying the extent of data snooping bias in technical
trading rule profitability. We test trading rule performances across 25,988 trading
rules for the emerging foreign exchange markets. We find that nearly all seemingly
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successes of technical analysis in our trading rule universe are in fact the result of
data mining bias. Even the out-of-sample tests, when not controlling for data snooping
bias, sometimes lead to many seemingly profitable but in fact spurious rules. These
striking results show that data snooping bias can be enormous both in-sample and
out-of-sample. Our findings continue to hold when we consider different transaction
costs, sub-sample analysis and various reduced universes of trading rules.
Our empirical results also provide a first comprehensive evidence of the technical
trading rule profitability for 10 emerging countries’ exchange rates. The universe of our
trading rules includes simple rules, charting rules with kernel smoothing and complex
trading rules. Although popular among professional traders, the majority of these
trading rules have not been studied in the literature for emerging FX markets. Our
paper depicts a more complete picture of the performance of trading rules and market
efficiency for emerging foreign exchange markets. Overall we find rare evidence against
the efficiency of emerging FX markets.
Investors have to be careful when applying technical analysis to these markets, given
the substantial data snooping bias that is likely to be involved. Further research,
such as the investigation of economic explanations for trading rules’ profitability or
determinants of its cross country variation, also needs to account for the danger of data
snooping.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Description of Simple Trading Rules
Our descriptions of simple trading rules draw heavily on Sullivan, Timmermann, and
White (1999), Qi and Wu (2006) and Hsu and Kuan (2005), though we have made some
modifications to avoid ambiguities.
Filter Rules
The filter rule strategy for generating a trading signal follows Sullivan, Timmermann,
and White (1999) and Qi and Wu (2006). The basic filter rule could be stated as follows:
if the daily closing price (in British Pound) of a foreign currency moves up by x% or
more from its most recent low, the speculator borrows the British Pound and uses the
proceeds to buy and hold the foreign currency until its price moves down at least x%
from a subsequent high, at which time the speculator short sells the foreign currency
and uses the proceeds to buy the British Pound. Two definitions of the subsequent
high (low) are considered. One is the highest (lowest) closing price over the period
of holding a particular long (short) position. The alternative high (low) refers to the
highest (lowest) price over the e most recent days. We also consider that a given long or
short position is held for prespecified c days during which period all other signals are
ignored.
Moving Average Rules
Moving averages are among the oldest trading rules used by chartist. The (equally
weighted) moving average of a currency price for a given day t over the n days is
1
n
∑n−1
i=0 st−i. Under a simple single moving average rule, when the current price is
above the moving average by an amount larger than the band with b%, the speculator
borrows the British Pound to buy the foreign currency. Similarly, when the current
price is below the moving average by b%, the speculator short sells the foreign currency
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to buy the British Pound. Under dual moving average rule, when the short moving
average of a foreign currency price is above the long moving average by an amount
larger than the band with b%, the speculator borrows the British Pound to buy the
foreign currency. If the short moving average of a foreign currency price penetrates the
long moving average from above, the speculator short sells the foreign currency to buy
the British Pound. Following Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) and Qi and Wu
(2006), we implement the moving average rules with a time delay filter in addition to
the fixed percentage band filter as described above. The time delay filter requires that
the long or short signals remain valid for d days before action is taken. Similar to the
filter rule case, we also consider holding a given long or short position for c days during
which period all other signals are ignored.
Trading Range Break (or Support and Resistance) Rules
The support and resistance level refers to certain price levels acting as barriers to
prevent traders from pushing the price of an underlying asset in a certain direction.
Under a trading range break rule, when the price of a foreign currency moves above
the maximum price (resistance level) over the previous n days by b%, the speculator
borrows the British Pounds to buy the foreign currency. When the price falls below
the minimum price over the previous n days by b%, the speculator sells short the
foreign currency and buys the British Pound. Alternatively, we use the local maximum
(minimum), which refers to the highest (lowest) price over the e most recent days, as
the definition for the resistance level. Here we also allow a time delay filter, d, as well
as the holding period of c days to be included, as in the case of moving average rules.
Channel Breakout Rules
A channel occurs when the high price of a foreign currency over the previous n days is
within x% of the low over the previous n days. Under a channel breakout rule, when the
closing price of the foreign currency exceeds the channel by b%, a signal is generated
for the speculator to borrow the British Pound and buy the foreign currency. Likewise,
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when the closing price of the foreign currency drops below the channel by b%, a signal
is generated for the speculator to short sell the foreign currency and buy the British
Pound. Again, we consider a holding period of c days.
Momentum strategies
A momentum strategy attempts to predict the strength or weakness of the current
market based on an "oscillator" constructed from a momentum measure. We follow
Hsu and Kuan (2005) and use the rate of change (ROC) as the momentum measure.
The m-day ROC at time t is defined as the change of spot exchange rate divided by the
closing spot exchange rate at time t −m. Two oscillators are considered: the simple
oscillator (which is just m-day ROC), and the moving average oscillator (which is the
w-day moving average of m-day ROC with w ≤ m). An overbought/oversold level k
(say 5% or 10%) is needed to determine whether a position should be initiated. When
the oscillator penetrates the overbought level from below, the speculator borrows the
British Pound to buy the foreign currency. If the oscillator crosses the oversold level
from above, the speculator sells short the foreign currency and buys the British Pound.
Once again, we consider a holding period of c days.
Appendix B: Documentation of Trading Rules Parameters
Simple Rules
Filter Rules (FR)
x: increase in the log pound value of foreign currency required to generate a "buy"
signal
y: decrease in the log pound value of foreign currency required to generate a "sell"
signal
e: the number of the most recent days needed to define a low (high) based on which the
filters are applied to generate "long" ("short") signal
c: number of days a position is held during which all other signals are ignored
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x = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03, 0.035, 0.04, 0.045, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08,
0.09, 0.1, 0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3 (24 values)
y = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1 (12 values)
e = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20 (8 values)
c = 5, 10, 25, 50 (4 values)
Noting that y must be less than x, there are 185 (x,y) combinations
Number of rules in FR class = x+x×e+x×c+ ((x,y) combinations) = 24+192+96+185 =
497
Moving Average Rules (MA)
n: number of days in a moving average
m: number of fast-slow combinations of n
b: fixed band multiplicative value
d: number of days for the time delay filter
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
n = 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200, 250 (15 values)
m =
∑n−1
i=1 i = 105
b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 (8 values)
d = 2, 3, 4, 5 (4 values)
c = 5, 10, 25, 50 (4 values)
Number of rules in MA class: = n + m + b × (n + m) + (d × (n + m) + c × (n + m) + 9
= 15 + 105 + 960 + 480 + 480 + 9 = 2049
Support and Resistance (SR, or Trading Range Break) Rules
n: number of days in the support and resistance range;
e: used for an alternative definition of extrema where a low (high) can be defined as the
most recent closing price that is less (greater) than the n previous closing prices;
b: fixed band multiplicative value;
d: number of days for the time delay filter;
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 (10 values);
e = 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 25, 50, 100, 200 (10 values);
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b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 (8 values);
d = 2, 3, 4, 5 (4 values);
c = 5, 10, 25, 50 (4 values);
Number of rules in SR class = [(1 + c)× (n+ e)] + [b× (n+ e)× (1 + c)] +[d× c× (n+ e)]=
100 + 800 + 320 = 1220
Channel Breakout Rules (CBO)
n: number of days for a channel
x: difference between the high price and the low price (x×low price) required to form a
channel
b: fixed band multiplicative value (b < x)
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 (10 values);
x = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.05, 0.075, 0.10 (8 values)
b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 (8 values)
c = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values)
Noting that b must be less than x. There are 43 (x,b) combinations.
Number of rules in CBO class = n×x×c+n×c×((x,b) combinations)= 320+1720 = 2040
Momentum Strategies in Price (MSP)
m: number of days rate of change in price;
w: number of days in moving average;
k: overbought/oversold level;
f : fixed holding days;
m = 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 125, 250 (10 values);
w = 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 125, 250 (10 values);
k = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.2 (4 values);
f = 5, 10, 25, 50 (4 values);
Noting that w must be less than or equal to m, there are 55 w −m combinations.
Number of rules in MSP class = m× k × f+ ((m,w) combinations)×k × f = 160 + 880
= 1040
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Charting Rules with Kernel Smoothing
The Charting rules share common parameters, so we first describe them here.
k: fixed band multiplicative value;
f : fixed holding days;
r: stop loss rate;
d: parameter for fixed liquidation price;
y: multiple of standard deviation of daily exchange-rate changes used to liquidate the
position;
b: multiple of optimal bandwidth of kernel regression;
k = 0, 0.005, 0.01; (3 values)
f = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values)
r = 0.005, 0.0075, 0.01; (3 values)
d = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75; (3 values)
y = 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2.00, 2.5, 3.00, 3.50, 4.00, 4.50 (10 values)
b = 0.3, 1, 4 (3 values)
Head-and-Shoulders (HS)
x: differential rate of shoulders or troughs
x = 0.015, 0.03, 0.05; (3 values)
Number of rules in HS class = (x× k × r × d× y + x× k × f)× (1 + b)= (810 + 36)× 4
= 3384
Triangle (TA)
Number of rules in TA class: = (k × r × d× y + k × f)× (1 + b)= (270 + 12)× 4 = 1128
Rectangle (RA)
Number of rules in RA class = (x× k × r × d× y + x× k × f)× (1 + b)= (810 + 36)× 4
= 3384
Double Tops and Bottoms (STB)
x: differential rate of shoulders or troughs
n: least day differential between two tops/bottoms;
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x = 0.015, 0.03, 0.05; (3 values)
n = 22 (1 value);
Number of rules in DTB class: = (x × k × r × d × y × n + x × k × f × n) × (1 + b)
= (810 + 36)× 4= 3384
Broadening Tops and Bottoms (BTB)
Number of rules in BTB class: = (k× r× d× y + k× f)× (1 + b)= (270 + 12)× 4 = 1128
Complex Rules
Learning strategies (LS)
m: memory span;
r: review span;
m = 2, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 125, 250 (8 values);
r = 1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 125, 250 (8 values);
Noting that r ≤ m, there are 36 (m,r) combinations.
We have 2 performance measures: the sum of m daily returns, and the sharpe ratio.
In addition, including class with kernel smoothed series and learning on all non-complex
rules, there are 5 + 5× 4 + 1 = 26 classes of trading rules.
Number of rules in LS class = 36× 2× 26 = 1872
Voting Strategies (VS)
Number of rules in VS class = 26
Fraction Position Strategies (FRS)
Number of rules in FRS class = 25 + 1 = 26
Voting by learning strategies (VLS)
m: memory span;
r: review span;
n: number of top trading rules chosed within a class;
m = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 125, 250 (9 values);
r = 1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 125, 250 (8 values);
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n = 2, 3, 5, 10, 50 (5 values)
Number of rules in VLS class: = 37× 26× 5 = 4810
Total number of trading rules = 497 + 2049 + 1220 + 2040 + 1040 + 3384 + 1128 + 3384 +
3384 + 1128 + 1872 + 26 + 26 + 4810 = 25988
Appendix C: Tests without Data Snooping Bias
In this section, we discuss the two stepwise bootstrap tests (StepM and SSPA) men-
tioned in the previous section. However, we start with the Reality Check and SPA test,
since StepM is a stepwise version of the former and the SSPA test is a stepwise version
of the latter. Our notations are similar to Hansen (2005).
Reality check
White (2000) tests the null hypothesis that the benchmark is not inferior to any of the
m alternative trading rules:
H0 : µ ≤ 0, (A.1)
where µ = E(dt) and is a m× 1 vector (µ ∈ Rm), while dt = (d1,t, · · · , dm,t) is the m× 1
vector of relative performance measures. Look at the vector of relative performance
measure gives consideration to the full set of models underlying the vector that led
to the best performing trading rule. Rejecting equation A.1 implies that at least one
trading rule beats the benchmark. White proceeds to construct the reality check from
the test statistics,
Tn ≡ max(n1/2d1, · · · , n1/2dm), (A.2)
dm is the average performance of model m across n observations.
To calculate the p-value for the null hypothesis, White (2000) recommends the sta-
tionary bootstrap method of Politis and Romano (1994) to first obtain the empirical
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distribution of T ∗n :
T ∗n(b) = max[n
1/2(d1(b)− d1), · · · , (n1/2dm(b)− dm)], b = 1, · · · , B (A.3)
The p-value is obtained by comparing Tn with the quantiles of the empirical distribution
of T ∗n(b). If the p-value is smaller than a given significance level, the null hypothesis is
rejected.
SPA test
The null hypothesis of SPA test [Hansen (2005)] is the same as in White’s Reality
Check. Unlike the White’s Reality Check, the SPA test uses the studentized test
statistic, which will typically improve the power. Hansen (2005) provides a concrete
example for highlighting the advantage of studentizing the individual statistics, since
it avoids a comparison of the performance measured in different "units of standard
deviation". Furthermore, the SPA test invokes a sample-dependent distribution under
the null hypothesis, which can discard the poor models asymptotically. Therefore, the
new test is more powerful and less sensitive to the inclusion of poor and irrelevant
alternatives. The test statistic for SPA is given as follows:
TSPAn = max[maxk=1,··· ,m
n1/2dk
ωˆk
, 0], (A.4)
where ωˆ2k is some consistent estimator of ω
2
k = var(n
1/2dk). Then an re-centered estima-
tor µˆc for µ is chosen such that it conforms with the null hypothesis based on Nm(µˆc, Ωˆ).
The particular µˆc suggested by Hansen (2005) is µˆck = dkI{n1/2dk/ωˆk≤−
√
2loglogn} for
k = 1, · · · ,m, where I is the indicator function. It can be shown that for a poor trading
rule µk < 0, it has little effect on the distribution, and for a sufficiently large n, it will
be discarded eventually. The improvement of the power of the SPA test over the Reality
Check is further confirmed by the simulation experiment conducted in Hansen (2005).
The p-value of TSPAn is calculated by bootstrapping its empirical distribution and then
comparing the TSPAn with the quantiles of the empirical distribution of TSPA∗n (b, n).
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That is:
pˆSPA ≡
B∑
b=1
I{TSPA∗n (b,n)>TSPAn }
B
(A.5)
Furthermore, Hansen (2005) defines another two p-values, which are not consistent,
but can serve as the upper and lower bound for the consistent p-value. It imposes the
null by recentering the bootstrap variables at µˆl or µˆu, instead of µˆc. That is:
Z∗k,b,t ≡ d∗k,b,t − gi(dk), (A.6)
where i = l, c, u, gl(x) = max(0, x), gu(x) = x, and gc(x) = x× I{x≥−√(ωˆ2k/n)2loglogn}. One
can show that E(Z∗k,b,t) = µˆ
i for i = l, c, u.
StepM test
Both the Reality Check and the SPA test seek to answer whether the best trading
strategy beats the benchmark. As discussed in section 3.1, it is often more interesting
to identify all outperforming trading rules, or to know whether a particular trading rule
improves upon the benchmark. The Reality Check can be modified easily for identifying
potential strategies that beat the benchmark, but Romano and Wolf (2005) show that
this is only suboptimal, and only amounts to the first step of StepM test of Romano and
Wolf (2005), which can detect more good strategies from the second step on. The StepM
test is therefore more powerful than the Reality Check in detecting superior trading
rules. The aim of the StepM test is to find as many profitable trading rules as possible.
Their null hypothesis is considered as the individual hypothesis test:
Hk0 : µk ≤ 0, (A.7)
The individual decisions are made in a manner that asymptotically controls for the
familywise error rate (FWE) at the significance level α. The FWE is defined as the prob-
ability of incorrectly identifying at least one strategy as superior. The joint confidence
region is constructed to have a nominal joint coverage probability of 1− α in each stage,
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which is fulfilled by choosing a parameter ci at the stage i. In the first stage it assumes
the form of
[d1 − c1,∞)× · · · × [dm − c1,∞) (A.8)
If 0 /∈ [dk − c1,∞), then the kth trading rule is detected as profitable. This first step
can detect more than one profitable rule. For the second step, all the profitable rules
found in the first step are dropped from the universe and only remaining rules are used
to form the new universe. Forming a similar confidence interval as in (A.8), though
replacing c1 by c2, one can detect the profitable trading rules, if any, from the remaining
rules by checking whether or not the individual confidence interval [dk− c2,∞) contains
zero. If no profitable rules are found, one should stop; otherwise, one continues this way
until no profitable rules can be detected. Since the individual confidence interval in the
joint confidence interval typically shrinks with the increasing number of testing steps,
more profitable trading rules can be detected than when only relying on the first step.
Romano and Wolf (2005) also propose the use of studentization to improve the power
and level properties of the StepM test.
Stepwise SPA test
The Stepwise SPA test of Hsu and Hsu (2006) combines the SPA test and the StepM
test to improve the power. It uses the studentized test statistic as in SPA test, and
impose a null to center the bootstrap variables around µˆc as in the SPA test, such that
poor and irrelevant trading rules will be discarded asymptotically. They provide formal
proof and simulation results to demonstrate that the SSPA test is more powerful than
the Reality Check, SPA test, and StepM test.
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CHAPTER 3
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LEADING INDICATOR
PROPERTIES OF THE YIELD CURVE IN THE
PRESENCE OF STRUCTURAL INSTABILITY∗
ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an extensive reexamination of the leading indicator properties of
the yield curve. We study whether the yield spread still qualifies as a useful predictor
of real activity in the presence of model instability and forecast breakdowns. Multiple
break tests provide strong evidence for structural change and allow us to pin down the
exact dates associated with these breaks. We find that window selection methods newly
developed for forecasting in the presence of structural change offer some improvements
in terms of forecast accuracy. Overall, our results strongly suggest, however, that the
yield curve has been losing its edge as a predictor of output growth in recent years.
∗This chapter is based on a joint paper with Andreas Schrimpf (Aarhus University). A revised version of
the paper is forthcoming in the International Journal of Forecasting.
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3.1 Introduction
The slope of the yield curve is one of the most widely followed economic variables.
The alertness of professional economists, market watchers and central bankers can
largely be ascribed to the bulk of empirical literature which has documented the term
spread’s usefulness for predicting future GDP growth.1 However, recently concerns
have been raised over the fact that the predictive performance of the term spread
may be time-variant and that predictive regressions based on the yield spread may
suffer from parameter instability (e.g. Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich, 2003; Stock and
Watson, 2003; Giacomini and Rossi, 2006).
The main goal of this paper is therefore to investigate whether the yield spread still
qualifies as a useful leading indicator in environments characterized by model insta-
bility. We mainly focus on two issues in the paper: i) the out-of-sample (OOS) forecast
performance of the yield spread (slope of the yield curve) for real activity and, of par-
ticular importance, how this OOS predictive performance evolves over time. ii) we
investigate whether newly developed window selection techniques for environments
characterized by structural breaks (put forth in a recent article by Pesaran and Tim-
mermann, 2007) may help enhance the empirical performance of the yield curve for
forecasting. Given the major focus of the previous literature on the empirical relation-
ship between the yield curve and subsequent output growth in the US, we consider
international data from Canada, Germany, and the UK as additional “hold-out samples”
to examine the usefulness of the yield curve as a leading indicator.2
While the in-sample predictive performance of the yield curve is well studied and
established, the time-varying nature of the relationship is comparatively unexplored
and has only received attention in recent years. A major motivation of this paper
1The general finding in the literature is that an inverted yield curve precedes periods of slow economic
growth (See e.g. the contributions by Harvey, 1989; Stock and Watson, 1989; Estrella and Hardouvelis,
1991; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, etc.).
2Several papers have shown that the yield spread also serves as a significant predictor for real activity in
countries outside the US (See e.g. Jorion and Mishkin, 1991; Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Bernard
and Gerlach, 1998; Stock and Watson, 2003; Benati and Goodhart, 2007). In the same vein, our paper also
provides insights through an international perspective. This can help mitigate potential data-snooping
concerns due to repeated visits of the US dataset.
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is therefore to take a closer look at the time-varying forecasting performance of the
yield curve for real output growth. The main economic rationale for the yield spread’s
predictive power is that it serves as an indicator for the effectiveness of monetary policy
or the stance of the monetary policy (See e.g. Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich, 2003).
If the central bank raises short-term interest rates and market participants expect
this policy to be effective in curbing inflation in the long run, long-term rates (averages
of future expected short rates according to the expectations hypothesis) should rise
in a smaller proportion. Thus, a restrictive monetary policy tends to flatten the yield
curve and at the same time slows down the economy.3 However, there are strong
theoretical reasons to believe that the relationship may vary over time. As noted by
Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich (2003), for instance, the predictive power may depend
on underlying factors such as the form of the monetary policy reaction function or the
relative importance of real and nominal shocks in the economy. Both factors may be
subject to variation over time, which raises the need to investigate the time-variation
of the forecasting relationship in greater detail.
As yet, most of the papers addressing the issue of model instability focus on an in-
sample analysis of time-varying predictive ability, using mainly sub-sample analysis
(e.g. Stock and Watson, 2003), parameter stability tests (e.g. Estrella, Rodrigues, and
Schich, 2003) or time-varying parameter models (e.g. Benati and Goodhart, 2007).
However, one may argue that the ultimate concern for market participants and policy
makers is out-of-sample forecast accuracy as well as a good predictive performance
towards the end of the sample period. Hence, our paper distinguishes itself from the
remaining literature with its explicit focus on the time-varying out-of-sample (OOS)
forecasting properties of the yield curve. We first illustrate the dynamics of forecasting
ability via diagnostic plots displaying the evolution of squared forecast errors over time
compared to those of a benchmark model. This approach has recently been put forth by
Goyal and Welch (2008) in the field of stock return predictability. Using these tools, we
document a substantial amount of time-variation in the OOS predictive accuracy of the
yield spread which has not previously been shown in the literature. Our findings also
3See Estrella (2005) for a formal rational expectations model providing a theoretical account of the
relationship.
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suggest that the relative OOS forecast accuracy of models based on the yield spread
has diminished substantially towards the end of the sample period, which holds true in
almost all countries considered.
We thus take a deeper look at potential reasons for this degradation of predictive power
and forecast breakdowns by running several modern (in-sample) tests for parameter
stability in order to back up the OOS evidence by further formal tests. In particular,
we apply the structural break test by Elliott and Müller (2006) – testing the null of
parameter stability against the alternative of an unknown number of breaks – as well
as structural break tests allowing for multiple breaks developed by Bai and Perron
(1998, 2003). These tests largely corroborate our out-of-sample results. We find that
the relation of the yield curve and output growth is subject to substantial instabilities
in all countries considered.
Hence, it seems natural to investigate whether methods of optimal forecast window
selection – which have recently been put forth by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007)
for situations where structural breaks are present – yield a better forecast accuracy
when the predictive regressions are plagued by parameter instabilities. According
to our findings, these optimal window selection methods typically do a good job in
reducing the bias of forecast errors. There is also some (though not uniform) evidence
on improvements regarding forecast error variance. However, our main finding that
the OOS forecast capacity of the yield curve has diminished towards the end of the
sample period at an international level still holds under these modified forecasting
schemes. Hence, accounting for the existence of structural breaks via optimal window
selection methods does not suffice to prevent the poor performance of the yield spread
as a leading indicator over most of the 1990s.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains a brief
overview of our data and provides a reexamination of the leading indicator properties
of the yield spread. The main focus is the assessment of time-varying out-of-sample
forecast power. In Section 3.3 we discuss the results of structural break tests and
the forecast performance of window selection methods designed for environments
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characterized by model instability. This allows us to judge whether the yield curve
still qualifies as a useful leading indicator in environments characterized by structural
change. Section 3.4 examines the role of other yield curve information beyond the term
spread. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Predictive Power of the Yield Spread: A Reexam-
ination
This section reexamines the predictive power of the yield spread for real activity in
Canada, Germany, the UK and the US.4 First, we corroborate the typical result in
literature that the yield spread is a significant and strong (in-sample) predictor of
real output growth over horizons k = 4, . . . , 8 quarters. This result is confirmed by
out-of-sample evaluation statistics. Most importantly, however, we document a strong
degree of time-variation in the OOS predictive performance and present evidence of a
degradation in the relative OOS forecast performance of the yield spread in all countries
considered.
Data Overview
Our dataset comprises time series of real GDP, three-month interest rates ishort, long-
term government bond yields ilong for Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Data were obtained mainly from the following sources: national
central banks, Datastream (national sources as well as the IMF-IFS database), and
Reuters-Ecowin. The sample period ranges from 1962:Q1 to 2006:Q2. During this
sample period the necessary data are available for all four countries, which facilitates a
cross-country comparison of the leading indicator properties of the yield curve. Further
detailed information on the data, their sources and data transformation is provided in
Appendix 3.5.
4In this section we also lay out several of the econometric techniques used in the paper. They include
bootstrap-based inference in (in-sample) predictive regressions as well as the OOS forecast evaluation
methods applied in the paper.
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In-sample Predictive Regressions
Following the vast majority of the extant literature (e.g Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991;
Stock and Watson, 2003), we use predictive regressions in order to investigate the
informational content of the yield curve for future real GDP growth. The predictive
regression is based on the direct multi-step forecasting approach and takes the following
form:
yt+k = β0 + β
′
1zt + β
′
2xt + t+k. (A.1)
yt+k denotes the (log) growth rate of real GDP from t to t+ k, yt+k = (400/k) ln(Yt+k/Yt),
where Yt is the level of real GDP as of period t. We refer to yt+k as cumulative real GDP
growth hereafter. zt contains the specific yield curve variable we are interested in. Our
main focus is on the term spread, which is defined as the difference of the long term
government bond yield and the short term interest rate: ilong − ishort. xt represents (a
vector of) additional control variables. In particular, we use the lagged quarterly growth
rate of real GDP as an additional predictor as in Stock and Watson (2003) in order to
judge the predictive content of the yield curve beyond the information contained in the
past history of the dependent variable.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the predictive linear regression in Equation (A.1),
the approach is plagued by econometric problems due to overlapping observations of
the dependent variable. A common remedy for this problem is to use kernel-based
HAC standard errors, e.g. according to Hansen and Hodrick (1980) or Newey and West
(1987b), which are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Although
these commonly applied estimators of the long-run covariance matrix deliver consistent
estimates, recent evidence suggests that they do not perform well in small sample sizes
typically encountered in predictive regressions (See e.g. Goncalves and White, 2005;
Ang and Bekaert, 2007). We therefore use a moving block bootstrap (MBB) methodology
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which is particularly suitable in a finite-sample setting with dependent data.5
Table 3.1 presents estimation results on the predictive power of the term spread for
Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US. The sample period is 1962:Q1-2006:Q2. All
estimation results are based on models including a constant and lagged output growth
(for the sake of brevity only the estimated coefficient on the term spread βˆTS1 is reported).
The term spread is defined as the difference between the long term interest rate and
the three-month interest rate.
Panel A of Table 3.1 displays results when the dependent variable is defined as cu-
mulative real GDP growth, and when the forecasting horizons (denoted by k) are 4,
6 and 8 quarters. Besides the conventional statistics, we also provide a “bootstrap
p-value” for the R2 of the predictive regression (denoted as %[R¯2b > R¯
2] in the table)
which is calculated as the fraction of times that the adjusted R2 in bootstrap samples
(generated under the null of no predictability) exceeds the adjusted R2 of the regres-
sion.6 Overall, we obtain the well-known picture from previous studies. The term
spread has a significant (in-sample) predictive power for real activity. The coefficient
on the term spread βˆTS1 is positive and significant, which holds across all countries
and (almost) all considered forecasting horizons. Similarly, the adjusted R2 shows the
model’s significant predictive ability. The predictive power appears to be particularly
strong in the case of Canada and Germany, where the term spread’s coefficient is highly
significant even for horizons up to 8 quarters. Note, however, that the predictive power
of the yield spread is relatively weak in the UK and refers only to a horizon below 8
quarters.
Although cumulative GDP growth is commonly used as the dependent variable, it is
also interesting to consider marginal GDP growth as the dependent variable, since one
5In a simulation study, Goncalves and White (2005) show that inference based on the MBB may be
considerably more accurate in small samples compared to standard kernel-based HAC standard errors.
Contrary to a parametric bootstrap (as used e.g. by Kilian (1999) for inference in predictive regressions),
the MBB is a non-parametric bootstrap which draws blocks of re-sampled observations randomly with
replacement from the time series of original observations. As recommended by Goncalves and White
(2005), we use a data-driven block length, following the procedure by Andrews (1991).
6In this context, we use a parametric bootstrapping scheme based on an assumed DGP for the predictors
as individual AR(1)-processes (see e.g. Kilian, 1999; Mark, 1995; Rapach, Wohar, and Rangvid, 2005, for
similar approaches).
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can assess how far into the future the predictive power of the yield curve can reach
(e.g. Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Dotsey, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 2002). Marginal
GDP growth is defined as yt+k−h,t+k = 400/h[ln(Yt+k/Yt+k−h)]. Our results in Table
1 (Panel B) focus on marginal GDP growth over the past four quarters (h = 4) and
forecasting horizons of k = 6, 8 and 10 quarters.7
As depicted in Table 3.1 (Panel B), the marginal predictive power of the term spread
declines substantially when the predictive horizon increases. The adjusted R2 and the
significance of the coefficients indicate that the predictive power refers mostly to a
horizon up to 8 quarters and vanishes at the 10 quarter horizon. Again, the weakest
results are observed for the UK, where the information in the yield spread refers only
to a shorter horizon up to 6 quarters.
Out-of-sample Performance
We now investigate the capacity of the yield curve to predict real activity out-of-sample
(OOS). The first 10 years (1962:Q1-1972:Q1) are used as an initialization period for the
models, afterwards forecasts are generated using a recursive scheme (i.e., an expanding
forecasting window). This provides us with n = T −m − k − 1 OOS forecasts of real
GDP growth, where m represents the length of the initialization period and T denotes
the overall sample size.
In Table 3.2 and Table 3.5 we provide several forecast evaluation statistics. First, we
report the mean forecast error and the corresponding bootstrapped standard error (also
based on the MBB). A significant mean forecast error can be interpreted as evidence
against the hypothesis of forecast unbiasedness. We also report results from traditional
Mincer-Zarnowitz (1969) regressions, where the realizations of real GDP growth are
regressed on a constant and the corresponding forecasts. According to these statistics,
the better the forecasting model, the closer the intercept aˆ should be to zero and the
7By definition, the results for cumulative GDP growth and marginal GDP growth are the same if both k
and h are set to four, so we omit a forecast horizon of k = 4 in Panel B of Table 1.
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slope bˆ should be to one.8 Another simple descriptive measure of forecast evaluation is
Theil’s U, which is the ratio of the root-mean squared error (RMSE) of the prediction
model to the RMSE of the benchmark model. As is common in the literature nowadays
(e.g. Stock and Watson, 2003 or Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei, 2006) we use an AR(1) as the
benchmark. If the forecast of the model is superior to the benchmark (given a quadratic
loss), Theil’s U should be less than one.
We mainly base our inference regarding superior OOS predictability on the test recently
proposed by Clark and West (2007). This test is designed for comparing a parsimonious
null model to a larger model which nests the null model, as is the case in our context.
The central idea of the Clark-West test is to adjust the mean squared forecast error
of the larger unrestricted model.9 In our context, we test whether the difference of
the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) of the AR(1)- benchmark model (Model 0) σˆ20
and the adjusted mean squared forecast error σˆ21−adj of the model of interest (Model 1)
is equal to zero against the alternative of superior forecast accuracy of the prediction
model (one-sided test). Clark and West (2007) suggest to adjust the MSFE of the larger
model as follows
σˆ21−adj = n−1
T−k∑
t=m+1
(yt+k − fˆ (1)t,t+k)2 − n−1
T−k∑
t=m+1
(fˆ (0)t,t+k − fˆ (1)t,t+k)2, (A.2)
where the GDP growth forecast (k-quarter ahead) based on the information set at time
t is denoted as fˆ (1)t,t+k for the case of the (unrestricted) model of interest and fˆ
(0)
t,t+k for the
case of the benchmark model. n is the number of OOS predictions: n = T−m−k−1. Note
that the first term in Equation (A.2) corresponds to the usual mean squared forecast
8However, it is well-known that the condition aˆ = 0, bˆ = 1 only represents a necessary but not sufficient
condition for unbiasedness (Clements and Hendry, 1998, p.57). Hence, we do not report results of the
joint test but merely report Mincer-Zarnowitz regression results along with the direct test whether the
mean forecast error is equal to zero.
9The reason for the adjustment put forth by Clark and West (2007) is that – under the null hypothesis
that the additional regressors in the larger model are not necessary for forecasting – there is the need to
estimate parameters of the unrestricted model that are zero in population, which introduces noise in the
forecast.
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error of the (unrestricted) model of interest, and the second term is the adjustment
term discussed above. In order to test whether Clark-West’s MSFE-adj (defined as
σˆ20 − σˆ21−adj) is equal to zero, we again use the MBB for inference to take account of
serial correlation.10
Table 3.2: Out-of-Sample Performance of the Yield Spread: Forecast Evaluation Statis-
tics
Horizon: k=4 CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -1.12 (0.27) -0.63 (0.31) -0.07 (0.43) -1.23 (0.25)
Theil’s U 0.87 0.85 1.05 0.97
MSFE-adj 3.59** 2.94** 0.22 3.77***
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ -0.81 (0.81) 0.38 (0.66) 2.27 (0.87) -0.12 (0.64)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.93 (0.16) 0.61 (0.20) 0.01 (0.33) 0.74 (0.12)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.38 0.15 0.00 0.38
Horizon: k=6 CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -1.24 (0.28) -0.73 (0.37) -0.17 (0.58) -1.22 (0.30)
Theil’s U 0.88 0.84 1.07 0.97
MSFE-adj 2.92** 2.77*** 0.01 2.91***
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ -0.80 (1.02) 0.60 (0.67) 2.74 (0.87) -0.24 (0.73)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.90 (0.21) 0.49 (0.18) -0.23 (0.29) 0.76 (0.14)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.38 0.12 0.01 0.38
Horizon: k=8 CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -1.27 (0.25) -0.76 (0.38) -0.18 (0.54) -1.02 (0.22)
Theil’s U 0.90 0.83 1.09 0.93
MSFE-adj 2.17** 2.22** -0.27 2.11***
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ -0.84 (1.28) 0.55 (0.65) 3.31 (0.85) -0.28 (0.81)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.90 (0.27) 0.50 (0.18) -0.45 (0.30) 0.82 (0.17)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.34 0.12 0.05 0.35
Note: This table presents various evaluation statistics of out-of-sample forecast performance of the yield spread for real activity. A recursive forecasting
scheme is used. The first 10 years (1962:Q1-1972:Q1) are used as initialization period. Theil’s U is the ratio of the RMSE of the models based on the term
spread and the RMSE of the AR(1)-benchmark model. MSFE-adj is the difference of the MSFE of the benchmark and the adjusted mean squared forecast
error according to Clark and West (2007) (*, **, *** denotes significance of Clark-West’s test statistic for testing equal predictive performance at the 10%, 5%,
and the 1% level). Coefficients and R2 of Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions are also reported. Bootstrapped standard errors (MBB with 99,999 replications) are
given in parentheses.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of OOS forecast evaluation for the model with cumula-
tive real GDP growth (over forecast horizons of k = 4, . . . , 8) as the dependent variable
and a constant, the term spread and lagged output growth as regressors. Inspection of
Table 3.2 reveals that forecasts based on the yield spread are usually upward biased.
In all countries (except the UK) a significant overprediction of real output growth
can be detected. However, Theil’s U and the Clark/West test indicate a superior out-
10Critical values from the standard normal distribution can be used to test the significance of MSFE-adj.
Simulations in Clark and West (2007) show that their test using MSFE-adj with standard normal critical
values is as accurate as other competing tests, while the power is as good or better.
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of-sample performance of the model including the spread over the benchmark model
for Canada, Germany and the United States. The poor out-of-sample performance
in the United Kingdom does not come as a surprise, given its comparatively weak
in-sample performance in Table 1. For the other three countries, the success of the yield
spread for out-of-sample forecasting is evident even for forecast horizons of 8 quarters.
The findings in Table 3.2 broadly corroborate results of OOS forecasting experiments
conducted elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Stock and Watson, 2003; Duarte, Venetis,
and Paya, 2005; Giacomini and Rossi, 2006) which have typically concluded that there
is a good OOS forecast performance of models using the yield spread relative to the
benchmark model.
As discussed before, however, there are several reasons to conjecture that the forecasting
relationship may be time-varying. Thus, in the following we shed some light on time-
variation of the relative OOS performance of the yield spread as a predictor of real
activity. This allows us to reexamine the yield curve’s usefulness as a leading indicator
in particular towards the end of the sample period, which is of ultimate concern for
market participants. We investigate the time-variation of OOS performance using
diagnostic plots, which are motivated by the recent work of Goyal and Welch (2008)
in the context of stock return predictability.11 To our knowledge such an analysis –
making the relative forecast performance over time transparent – has been lacking in
the literature so far.
Following Goyal and Welch (2008), we plot the cumulative sum of squared forecast
errors from a benchmark model minus the squared errors from the prediction model
Net− SSE(τ0, τ1) =
τ1∑
t=τ0
[(yt+k − fˆ (0)t,t+k)2 − (yt+k − fˆ (1)t,t+k)2], (A.3)
where τ0 is the starting date and τ1 is the end date at which the Net-SSE is evaluated.
fˆ
(0)
t,t+k (fˆ
(1)
t,t+k) are forecasts generated by the benchmark model (term spread model).
11In an extensive analysis for the US stock market, Goyal and Welch (2008) question the existence of stock
return predictability based on their finding of poor OOS performance over time.
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When Net-SSE is above the zero horizontal line, it indicates that the model of interest
outperforms the benchmark model (i.e. by producing lower squared forecast errors)
up to the period τ1. This graph is a rather informative diagnostic for comparing the
relative performance of competing models over time.
Figure 3.1 (based on a forecast horizon of 4 quarters) depicts how the OOS performance
of prediction models using the term spread model evolves over time relative to the AR(1)
benchmark. All four panels in Figure 3.1 indicate a strong time-variation of the forecast
performance. More concretely, Canada, US, and Germany all experience a rather good
forecast performance of the term spread in the early sub-sample period (1970s and
1980s). In these periods, models including the yield spread typically outperformed
the AR(1)-benchmark in terms of forecast accuracy. However, as the Net-SSE plots
forcefully demonstrate, for Canada (a) and the US (d) the OOS forecast performance
has deteriorated thereafter. Clearly, this calls into question the practical usefulness
of the yield spread as a predictor of real activity in those countries in the most recent
period. Similarly, in the case of Germany (b) no clear improvements of including the
yield spread in prediction models can be observed over the 1990s. As depicted by
the Net-SSE plot for the United Kingdom, the term spread has generally proved to
be a rather poor predictor out-of-sample throughout almost the whole sample period.
However, there are some periods (early 1980s and early 1990s) in which including the
term spread actually lowered squared forecast errors.
These results extend previous findings of a degradation of predictive performance of the
yield curve in the United States (already noted by Dotsey, 1998 or Stock and Watson,
2003) by adding an international perspective and by making forecast breakdowns
more transparent through an explicit focus on OOS forecasting. Having illustrated
the time-variation of the OOS performance and forecast breakdowns, it thus seems
natural to investigate the role of structural breaks for periods of breakdowns of forecast
performance in greater detail. This is the purpose of the next section.
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Figure 3.1: Time-varying Forecast Performance, Net-SSE, k=4
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Note: The figure shows Net-SSE plots following Goyal and Welch (2008). Net-SSE is the cumulated
difference of squared forecast errors of AR(1) benchmark model and the prediction model including the
yield spread and lagged GDP growth: Net-SSE(τ0, τ1) =
∑τ1
t=τ0
(e2b;t − e2m;t), where eb;t is the forecast error
of the benchmark, and em;t is the error of the prediction model. A decrease of the slope represents a better
forecast performance of the benchmark model at the particular point in time.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis of Model Instability and Forecast
Breakdowns
We now investigate the stability of the empirical relationship between the yield curve
and real activity. First, we briefly outline empirical methods, i.e., structural break tests
allowing for multiple breaks and forecast window selection methods in the presence
of breaks. Our empirical results reported in this section provide strong evidence that,
indeed, the relationship between the yield spread and output growth is subject to
substantial structural change in all countries of this study. Newly proposed window
selection methods offer improvements by reducing the bias of forecast errors and (in
some cases) forecast error variance. Nevertheless, using these methods is not enough to
prevent the deterioration of predictive power of the yield spread in the recent period.
Econometric Methods: Structural Break Tests and Window Selection for Fore-
casting
Predictive regressions for output growth using the yield spread as in Equation (A.1)
may be subject to potential structural instability. In particular, different monetary
policy regimes (e.g., whether the central bank is more concerned by the output gap or
deviations of inflation from the target) could be the reason for such a structural change
affecting the predictive relation. When structural change is strong enough, standard
inference becomes misleading. Moreover, the question of how to select the estimation
window in the presence of structural breaks arises, which is of ultimate importance
from a forecaster’s perspective.
Contrary to previous papers (Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich, 2003; Giacomini and
Rossi, 2006), we consider recently developed structural break tests allowing for multiple
structural breaks at an unknown date under the alternative. These tests have been
developed by Bai and Perron in a series of articles (Bai and Perron, 1998, Bai and
Perron, 2003, and Bai and Perron, 2006) and allow us to pin down the dates associated
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with the identified (multiple) breaks.12 More concretely, by allowing the parameters in
Equation (A.1) to vary across r + 1 regimes, we consider a predictive regression of the
following form:
yt+k = β
′
0,j + β
′
1,jzt + β
′
2,jxt + t+k. (t = Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj) (A.4)
where j = 1, .., r + 1, and r is the number of breaks in the linear regression. Note
that Equation (A.4) implies a splitting of the sample into r partitions. For each of
the r partitions within the set of admissible partitions, the least squares estimates of
βi,j , (i = 0, 1, 2) and the corresponding sum of squared residuals are obtained. Then, the
break date estimates Tˆ1, ..., Tˆr are selected as the ones globally minimizing the sum of
squared residuals. Bai and Perron (1998) also consider a test of the null hypothesis of l
breaks against the alternative l + 1 breaks by proposing a SupF (l + 1|l) test statistic.
If the reduction of the sum of squared residuals is significant, the null hypothesis of l
breaks is rejected in favor of the alternative of l + 1 breaks.
Sometimes interest lies on the question whether there is general instability of the
relationship and not on the exact number of breaks. To test the null hypothesis of
no break against an alternative hypothesis of an unknown number of breaks up to a
given upper bound R, Bai and Perron (1998) propose two double maximum statistics.
The double maximum statistics have weights ar reflecting priors on how likely various
numbers of breaks r might occur
Dmax = max1≤r≤R arSupFT (r). (A.5)
There are no precise theoretical guidelines about the choice of ar. A simple and obvious
candidate is to use a uniform weight, which leads to the so-called “UDmax" statistic.
Alternatively, weights can be chosen such that the marginal p-values are equal across
12Neither tests used by Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich (2003) [supLM-Test by Andrews (1993) and PR-test
by Ghysels, Guay, and Hall (1997)] nor the ones conducted by Giacomini and Rossi (2006) allow for
multiple breaks in the predictive relationship.
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values of r (See Bai and Perron, 1998, p.59). This version of double maximum statistic
is labeled as “WDmax".
Based on an extensive simulation study, Bai and Perron (2006) recommend a preferred
strategy for structural break testing in the presence of multiples breaks. First, the
UDmax and WDmax statistics are used to detect whether at least one break is present.
If this is the case, then the number of breaks l is identified by an examination of
the SupF (l + 1|l) tests, where l is associated with the break dates that minimize the
global sum of squared residuals. We closely adhere to this strategy in our empirical
application.
A simulation study conducted by Paye and Timmermann (2006) finds that the UDmax
as well as the SupF statistic can have size distortions under some circumstances.13
They find, instead, that the structural break test recently proposed by Elliott and
Müller (2006) performs better in those cases. Drawing on the similarities between the
concepts of “structural breaks" and “random coefficients", Elliott and Müller (2006)
propose to test the null hypothesis that βt = 0 for any t, where β = (β¯ + βt) against the
alternative hypothesis βt 6= 0 for some t > 1. This test statistic is easy to compute and
is labeled as q̂LL. For the purpose of completeness, we also provide the q̂LL statistic in
addition to the Bai-Perron tests.14
When forecasting time series by predictive regressions that are subject to structural
breaks, care has to be taken since breaks can severely affect the model’s out-of-sample
performance. This difficulty can be addressed by a careful selection of the estimation
window. Intuitively, one should estimate the model only with the data available after
the most recent break. However, as pointed out in a recent article by Pesaran and
Timmermann (2007), this conventional wisdom is not necessarily optimal since there
can be a tradeoff between forecast error bias and forecast error variance. Theoretical
13More concretely, they consider a predictive regression, where the regressors follow an AR(1) process.
When the predictors are persistent and the innovations in the predictive regression and those of the
AR(1) regression are strongly correlated, size distortions of the tests can be substantial.
14A detailed description of the steps for computing q̂LL can be found in Elliott and Müller (2006, p.914). We
use the GAUSS code provided by David E. Rapach for running the structural break tests. We thank David
E. Rapach for providing the code via his web page: http://pages.slu.edu/faculty/rapachde/Research.htm
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and simulation results by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) suggest that the forecasting
performance can typically be improved if (some) pre-break information is included.
However, there is typically a substantial estimation uncertainty regarding the exact
timing and the size of breaks in real-time, particularly when the breaks occur close to
the boundary of the data. For this reason, Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) propose
several forecast schemes which are based on a combination of forecasts from different
estimation windows, instead of a single estimation window.15 These approaches require
a minimum of ω observations for estimating the parameters of the forecasting models.
The last ω˜ observations of the estimation period are reserved for a (“pseudo”) OOS
evaluation of the different forecasts based on different sizes of the estimation window.
For each potential starting point w of the estimation window, a set of forecasts is
generated which are evaluated according to their MSFE within the evaluation window
ω˜. Then one can combine forecasts from different estimation windows fˆt+k,w, where
the weights are proportional to the inverse of the associated (“pseudo") MSFE in the
evaluation window
fˆweightedt+k (ω, ω˜) =
∑t−ω−ω˜
w=1 (fˆt+k,wMSFE(w|t, ω˜)−1)∑t−ω−ω˜
w=1 MSFE(w|t, ω˜)−1
. (A.6)
A more parsimonious approach is to put equal weight on all forecasts regardless of
the corresponding MSFE, which means that no evaluation of the forecasts within the
evaluation window ω˜ is needed. We denote the equally weighted forecast as “pooled
forecast". As noted by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007), the MSFE-weighted forecast
and the pooled forecast may work better if the breaks are small. Alternatively, one can
use a weight of one for the forecast based on the estimation window w which produces
the lowest MSFE within the evaluation window, and a weight of zero for all other
forecasts. This (so-called) “cross-validation" approach is more likely to work well if
there is a single break which is well defined and large.
15Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) provide simulation results which show that their combination ap-
proaches often work better than methods ignoring the presence of breaks. This is in line with the typical
result in the forecasting literature that forecast combinations often improve upon a single forecast (See
e.g., Timmermann, 2006).
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Empirical Results
Table 3.3 provides estimation results for different structural break tests. The predictive
regression of real GDP growth includes a constant, the term spread, and lagged GDP
growth as regressors, and the sample period covers 1962:Q1-2006:Q2 for all countries.
In Panel A, the q̂LL statistic proposed by Elliott and Müller (2006) and the UDMax
and WDmax statistics proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) test the null hypothesis of no
break against the alternative hypothesis of at least one break. All three test statistics
are significant at the 1% level for all countries. This provides strong evidence that the
predictive relationship between the yield spread and GDP growth has been affected by
structural change during our sample period.
Given the strong evidence for structural breaks, we follow the recommendation by Bai
and Perron (2006) and conduct SupF (l + 1|l) tests to identify the number and timing
of structural breaks.16 Panel B reports the results of these tests. According to the
SupF (l + 1|l) tests, three breaks are detected for Canada and the UK, and four breaks
are found for Germany and the US.
Table 3.4 reports estimated break dates and the associated confidence intervals.17 When
taking a closer look at estimated break dates, several interesting patterns emerge. Some
of the estimated break dates can be linked to particular phases of the business cycle,
well-known unanticipated events (such as the German reunification) or changes in the
monetary regime. For example, two out of the three break dates (1980:Q4 and 1990:Q4)
for Canada are very close to the particular peaks of the business cycle, as reported in
Demers and MacDonald (2007). For Germany, the break dates identified in 1989:Q4
and 1993:Q3 may be linked to the German unification, which is a typical example
of a real shock, and the turmoil in the European Monetary System after Germany’s
reunification boom. The break in 1999:Q2 in Germany can be ascribed to the European
16We impose the maximum number of breaks R to be five, and chose a trimming parameter of 0.15 for the
construction and critical values of these tests, as recommended by Bai and Perron (2006).
17Results of structural break tests for other horizons also indicate substantial instability. The results are
not reported for the sake of brevity but can be provided by the authors upon request.
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Monetary Union. In the case of the UK, the break identified in 1997:Q3 could be related
to the regain of the independence of the Bank of England. Structural breaks found in
the United States seem to be mostly related to business cycle turning points rather
than monetary regimes. All four break dates identified by the tests are close to either a
peak or a trough dated by NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee.18
Overall, our findings on the timing of breaks for Germany and the US are somewhat
different from the results of Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich (2003) who found no
evidence for breaks in Germany and only weak evidence in the case of the US. Their
results are obtained by applying the supLM-Test of Andrews (1993) and the PR-test of
Ghysels, Guay, and Hall (1997) to a sample from January 1967 and December 1997.
They also impose a rather large trimming parameter (25%), which implies that breaks
in the more recent period could not be detected. By contrast, our results are based on
more powerful recently developed tests which allow for multiple structural breaks.19
It is noteworthy, however, that we detect a break in 1983:Q4 for the US which is very
close to the (single) break identified in Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich (2003). We
find additional breaks in 1991:Q4 and 1999:Q1, which were not possible for Estrella,
Rodrigues, and Schich (2003) to detect given their sample period, trimming parameter
and methodology. Similarly, the two breaks (1993:Q3 and 1999:Q2) which we find in
the case of Germany could not be detected by Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich (2003) for
the same reason.
Given the strong evidence for structural breaks affecting the in-sample predictive re-
gression, a natural question appears: how is the out-of-sample forecasting performance
affected by these breaks? We address this question by using forecast combination
methods with different window lengths put forth by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007)
for forecasting in the presence of structural change.
Table 3.5 presents an evaluation of the out-of-sample performance using various forecast
schemes: a standard recursive scheme (no combination, expanding window size),
18See http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html
19Moreover, we also have a longer sample period available and impose a smaller trimming parameter.
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MSFE-weighted forecast combination (weighted forecasts from different estimation
windows with weights determined by the inverse of the MSFE in the evaluation
window), cross-validation (forecast from the single window with the lowest MSFE in
the evaluation period) and pooled forecast (average of forecasts based on different
estimation windows).20
The results for forecast window selection methods in the presence of breaks are rather
similar for Canada, Germany and US. All these combination schemes typically produce
forecasts with a substantially reduced bias. This is what should be expected given
the arguments in Pesaran and Timmermann (2007, p.138-139). However, only rather
modest improvements can be found in terms of forecast error variance as evinced by
Theil’s U or other evaluation statistics. Among the combination schemes, the pooled
forecast tends to generate a rather small forecast error variance, although it often
has a larger bias. The cross-validation approach – only based on a forecast using a
single estimation window – is typically the most fragile.21 Despite reducing the bias
in forecast errors, our results suggest that accounting for structural breaks by using
optimal window selection methods is not sufficient to prevent the deterioration of OOS
forecast accuracy of the yield spread documented in the previous section. Indeed, also
when these more sophisticated forecasting schemes are used, the degradation of OOS
forecast performance of the yield spread still continues to hold, as evinced by Figure 3.2.
20The minimum window length was set to 12 observations (3 years), the evaluation period was set to 16
observations (4 years).
21This finding links to the general result in the forecasting literature that simple combination approaches
often produce better forecasts compared to single forecasts or very sophisticated combination approaches
(See e.g. Timmermann, 2006).
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Figure 3.2: Time-varying Forecast Performance, Window Selection Methods
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(b) Germany
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(c) UK
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−250
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
200
250
year
N
et
−S
SE
US: Forecast Performance Over Time
 
 
Pooled
CV
MSFE
REC
(d) US
Note: The figure shows Net-SSE plots for forecasts based on different window selection methods.
The forecast horizon is 4 quarters. Net-SSE is the cumulated difference of squared forecast errors
of AR(1) benchmark model and the prediction model including the yield spread and lagged GDP growth:
Net-SSE(τ0, τ1) =
∑τ1
t=τ0
(e2b;t − e2m;t), where eb;t is the forecast error of the benchmark, and em;t is the
error of the prediction model. A decrease of the slope represents a better forecast performance of the
benchmark model at the particular point in time.
3.4 The Role of Other Yield Curve Information
The findings of the previous section suggest that the term spread has been losing its
edge as a leading indicator in recent years. Hence, the question emerges whether this
113
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LEADING INDICATOR PROPERTIES OF THE YIELD CURVE IN
THE PRESENCE OF STRUCTURAL INSTABILITY
finding applies to the yield curve as a whole. There are several reasons why other
components of the yield curve may contain information for future real activity beyond
the yield spread. First, it can be shown that the term spread can be expressed as
the sum of a (risk-neutral) expectations hypothesis component and a term premium
component (See e.g. Hamilton and Kim, 2002). Hence, simply using the slope of the
yield curve for forecasting implies that potentially useful information contained by the
yield curve could be neglected.22 Second, the level of the short rate could be considered
as an alternative measure of the stance of the monetary policy, which may also qualify
as a useful predictor as emphasized by Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006).
Therefore, in order to study the role of additional yield curve information for forecasting
real activity, we investigate the role of the short rate as well as a measure of time-
varying bond return risk premia. This allows us to analyze whether using these
variables in predictive regressions with or without the yield spread can be beneficial
from a forecasting perspective. Following Wright (2006), we use the bond return
forecasting factor by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) (denoted as CP-factor) as our proxy
for time-varying bond risk premia. Hence, our risk premia proxy is a measure of bond
return risk premia instead of the yield risk premia, which would be needed to decompose
the yield spread. We choose to use bond return risk premia instead of theoretically
more desirable yield risk premia in the face of substantial estimation uncertainties
associated with (long-end) yield curve decompositions (See Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2007
for further details). Moreover, as noted by Wright (2006), the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor
is correlated with term premia estimates obtained by other alternative methods (based
on (arbitrage-free) affine term structure models).
Table 3.6 displays estimation results of alternative model specifications. The sample
period covers 1972:Q4-2006:Q2 (Canada, Germany, US) and 1979:Q1-2006:Q2 (UK).23
22Hamilton and Kim (2002), for instance, decompose the predictive power of the term spread into an
expectations hypothesis and a term premium component using instrumental variables to identify the
expected path of future short rates. However, their approach using leads of short-term interest rates
cannot be used for real-time forecasting, which is the focus of this paper.
23The sample periods are restricted by the availability of zero bond data covering a whole range of
maturities. Note that data on zero bond yields for Canada (necessary to compute bond risk premia) are
only available from official sources for a rather short period. For this reason we omit models including
the CP-factor from the table in the case of Canada.
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As shown by the table, the short rate appears as a significant predictor of real activity
for every country considered. The negative coefficient is consistent with the reasoning
that an increase of short rate imposes higher costs of investment and is associated with
a subsequent slowdown of economic growth. In case of the UK it is noteworthy that the
short rate outperforms the term spread in terms of the predictive R¯2. When combining
the term spread with the short rate, however, we find that the short rate typically
tends to lose much its predictive ability while the spread in most cases maintains its
predictive power, consistent with Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994). Similarly, bond risk
premia (as proxied by the Cochrane/Piazzesi factor) generally have a rather limited
predictive content. Only in the US we find a significant effect of bond return risk premia
which disappears however when the term spread is controlled for. These (in-sample)
findings suggest that the major informational content of the yield curve for real activity
refers to the slope.
In order to judge the usefulness of alternative yield curve variables for OOS forecasting,
we provide evaluation statistics in Table 3.7 for the different model specifications. The
table shows that the short rate (Model 2) produces forecasts outperforming the naive
model (Theil’s U smaller than one and significant Clark-West statistics) similar to
the yield spread. The table shows further, however, that forecasts using the yield
spread (Model 1) tend to be more accurate. A notable exception, is the UK where
there is evidence that the short rate is the better yield curve variable for forecasting.
Including both the spread and the short rate generally leads to a degradation in
forecast performance. Similarly, the forecast performance of models including return
risk premia (Models 3 and 5) is not encouraging.
Based on both in-sample and out-of-sample results, we conclude that the short rate and
bond risk premia generally have a rather limited predictive ability and that the term
spread typically plays a dominant role.24 This implies that accounting for additional
yield curve information is unlikely to prevent the deterioration of the predictive content
24Regarding our conclusions on the role of the short rate, our results differ from those of Ang, Piazzesi,
and Wei (2006), who found an increased role of the short rate as a predictor of US output growth in
recent years. Our results are more in line with Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), which suggests that
the short rate plays a different role in models imposing no-arbitrage restrictions as in Ang, Piazzesi, and
Wei (2006).
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Table 3.7: Out-of-Sample Forecast Evaluation: Yield Spread and other Yield Curve
Variables
Model (1) CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -1.12 (0.25) -0.63 (0.30) -0.07 (-0.50) -1.23 (0.26)
Theil’s U 0.87 0.85 1.05 0.97
MSFE-adj 3.59** 2.94** 0.22 3.77***
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ -0.81 (0.81) 0.38 (0.66) 2.27 (0.87) -0.12 (0.64)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.93 (0.16) 0.61 (0.20) 0.01 (0.33) 0.74 (0.12)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.38 0.15 0.00 0.38
Model (2) CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -0.52 (0.59) -1.06 (0.34) 0.36 (0.43) 0.20 (0.65)
Theil’s U 0.90 0.93 0.90 1.05
MSFE-adj 5.13** 3.71** 5.18** 5.66**
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ 0.92 (0.92) 0.27 (0.56) 1.16 (0.53) 1.81 (0.46)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.59 (0.21) 0.56 (0.15) 0.59 (0.17) 0.43 (0.10)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.20 0.21 0.26 0.21
Model (3) CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -1.14 (0.32) -0.25 (0.41) -0.45 (0.38)
Theil’s U 1.00 1.00 1.01
MSFE-adj -0.02 0.09* -0.01
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ 1.73 (1.95) 3.95 (1.22) 2.09 (1.08)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.07 (0.69) -0.64 (0.50) 0.26 (0.33)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.00 0.02 0.01
Model (4) CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -0.56 (0.48) -0.90 (0.39) 0.33 (0.40) -0.45 (0.58)
Theil’s U 0.90 0.95 0.91 1.02
MSFE-adj 5.46** 4.45** 5.14** 6.67**
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ 0.90 (0.87) 0.61 (0.51) 1.19 (0.54) 1.36 (0.43)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.59 (0.20) 0.47 (0.12) 0.56 (0.17) 0.47 (0.09)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.22 0.18 0.25 0.32
Model (5) CAN GER UK US
Mean Forecast Error -0.61 (0.37) -0.06 (0.49) -1.21 (0.23)
Theil’s U 0.86 1.05 0.97
MSFE-adj 3.09** 0.20 3.72***
Mincer-Zarnowitz: aˆ 0.52 (0.63) 2.31 (0.87) -0.08 (0.62)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: bˆ 0.56 (0.19) 0.00 (0.30) 0.73 (0.12)
Mincer-Zarnowitz: R2 0.14 0.00 0.37
Note: This table presents various statistics of forecast evaluation (forecast horizon k=4 quarters). Different model
specifications based on different yield curve variables (term spread, short rate, return risk premia) are estimated.
The model specifications are given as
(1) Const, Term Spread, Lagged Output Growth
(2) Const, Short Rate, Lagged Output Growth
(3) Const, Bond Return Risk Premia (Cochrane-Piazzesi Factor), Lagged Output Growth
(4) Const, Term Spread, Short rate, Lagged Output Growth
(5) Const, Term Spread, Bond Return Risk Premia (Cochrane-Piazzesi Factor), Lagged Output Growth
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of the yield curve for real activity in the recent period.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we study whether the yield curve can still be regarded as a useful leading
indicator in forecasting environments characterized by structural change. Studying
the out-of-sample forecast accuracy of models using the yield spread over time relative
to a naive benchmark model, we are able to identify periods of particularly good and
bad performance. Our general finding is that there is a substantial degradation in the
out-of-sample forecast performance of the yield curve for real activity. This result holds
for all countries considered in the study (Canada, Germany, UK, and the US).
Another contribution of our paper is to investigate how parameter stability affects the
forecasting relationship. Using structural break tests allowing for multiple breaks
under the alternative, we find clear evidence for instabilities and are able to pin
down the dates associated with structural change. Moreover, we consider how to
optimally choose the forecasting estimation window in the presence of such breaks. For
this purpose, we use newly developed forecast combination methods by Pesaran and
Timmermann (2007) which also use pre-break information for forecasting. While these
methods help reduce the bias of forecast errors, they only produce minor improvements
in terms of a reduced forecast error variance. Hence, our overall results suggest that
the relationship of the yield curve and real activity has become clearly weaker in recent
years at the international level.
Our work can still be extended along the following lines. In particular, it would be
interesting to investigate further whether the model instabilities and time-variation
of out-of-sample forecast performance identified in this paper can be explained by
monetary regime shifts or by rather different aspects such as declining output volatility.
Another promising area would be to disentangle yield risk premia from the expectations-
hypothesis component of the yield spread [building upon the earlier work by Hamilton
and Kim (2002)]. The existing literature still falls short of an analysis whether sepa-
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rating the effects is helpful for out-of-sample forecast accuracy. For this purpose, yield
risk premia are needed, which can be reliably estimated in real-time without much
estimation error. Given the substantial estimation uncertainties noted by Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2007), obtaining such decompositions still poses a great challenge. We
leave these interesting issues for future research.
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Appendix A: Data Description
Table 3.8: Details on Data Construction
Variable Data Source Details on Data Construction
Panel A: Canada
Real GDP Datastream Seasonally adjusted time series of real GDP from
Statistics Canada.
Long-term interest rate Datastream/IMF-IFS Long-term government bond yield (10 years to ma-
turity) from Statistics Canada
Short-term interest rate Datastream/IMF-IFS Three-month T-bill rate.
Panel B: Germany
Real GDP Reuters-Ecowin Seasonally adjusted time series of real GDP (Stat.
Bundesamt). The outlier in the growth rate of real
GDP due to the reunification (1991:Q1) is adjusted
by interpolation as in Stock and Watson (2003):
the corresponding observation is replaced by the
median of the three previous and the three follow-
ing observations. Long-horizon growth rates are
calculated using the one-step growth rates.
Long-term interest rate Datastream/IMF-IFS Long term government bond yield (9-10 years to
maturity)
Short-term interest rate Datastream/IMF-IFS Three-month Money Market Rate calculated from
Bundesbank data.
Panel C: UK
Real GDP Datastream Seasonally adjusted time series of real GDP
growth (ONS).
Long-term interest rate Datastream/IMF-IFS Long term government bond yield (20 years to ma-
turity).
Short-term interest rate Datastream/IMF-IFS Treasury-bill rate calculated from Bank of Eng-
land data.
Panel D: USA
Real GDP Datastream Seasonally adjusted time series of real GDP
growth (BEA).
Long-term interest rate Federal Reserve Market yield on U.S. Treasury securities with 10-
year constant maturity
Short-term interest rate Federal Reserve Three-month Treasury-bill rate. Monthly data are
transformed into quarterly data.
Note: The sample period is usually 1962:Q1-2006:Q2 unless otherwise indicated.
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Appendix B: Estimating Return Risk Premia
This section provides a brief description on the estimation of our measure of time-
varying bond risk premia, which is the bond return forecast factor by Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005) (so called CP-factor). First, it is useful to define (one-year) holding
period returns (i.e. from t to t+4 quarters) on longer term bonds with n years to maturity
as hpr(n)t+4 = p
(n−1)
t+4 − p(n)t , where p(n)t denotes the log price of a bond maturing in n years.
By subtracting the one-year interest rate, excess returns rx(n)t+4 = hpr
(n)
t+4 − y(1)t are
obtained.
Under the expectations hypothesis, bond excess returns should not be predictable. As
shown by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), building on previous results by Fama and
Bliss (1987), a single combination of forward rates f (0,1)t , . . . , f
(m−1,m)
t is a significant
predictor of (one-year) bond excess returns of bonds of all maturities (n = 2, . . . ,m):25
rx
(n)
t+4 = β
(n)
0 + β
(n)
1 f
(0,1)
t + . . .+ β
(n)
m f
(m−1,m)
t + 
(n)
t+4, (A.7)
where f (n−1,n)t are forward rates implied by the yield curve: f
(n−1,n)
t = p
(n−1)
t − p(n)t . The
CP-factor as of period t is obtained as the fitted values of a regression of the average of
rx
(n)
t+4 over all maturities (n = 2, . . . ,m) on the term structure of forward rates.
26 Thus,
the CP-factor can be regarded as a measure of (one-year) bond return risk premia. In
order to avoid look-ahead bias and to make sure that only information truly available
to the forecaster as of period t is used, we use a recursively fitted CP-factor as the
measure of return risk premia.
25Drawing on the Fama/Bliss yield curve data, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) consider maturities ranging
from 2 to 5 years. Tang and Xia (2005) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2007) also show that the main results
extend to longer maturities and other datasets.
26In our implementation, we follow Tang and Xia (2005) in our selection of forward rates (f (0,1)t , f
(2,3)
t ,
f
(9,10)
t ) due to multicollinearity problems when neighboring forwards rates are used. See also Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2007) for more details on this issue.
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